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This paper examines the factors that influence the evaluation practices of American philanthropic 
foundations, using an institutional theory framework.  To this end, it explores the literature, contributed 
by both the academic community and esteemed philanthropic practitioners, that informs understanding of 
organizational dynamics in general and evaluation practices in particular.  From this literature emerged 
several propositions regarding the factors that influence evaluation practices.  As part of this study, these 
propositions were explored through key informant interviews with representatives from eight foundations 
headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  Through this approach, this paper contributes to the field by 
integrating the views of academic theorists, philanthropic thought leaders, and current practitioners.  
Relative to evaluation practices, the most striking findings were the importance of the grantee-funder 
relationship, the influence of grantees, and the impact of organizational lifecycle.   These insights have 
several implications for policy-makers and point to opportunities for further research.  
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. TIMELINESS OF RESEARCH ENDEAVOR ................................................................ 3 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................................................... 7 
2.1. INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS ...................................................................................... 7 
2.1.1. STAKEHOLDER THEORY ............................................................................... 10 
2.1.2. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE ........................................................................ 11 
2.1.3. INSTITUTIONAL THEORY .............................................................................. 12 
2.2. PHILANTHROPY AND CIVIL SOCIETY ................................................................... 16 
2.2.1. PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY IN AMERICA .................................................... 19 
2.2.2. INSTITUTIONAL TENSIONS........................................................................... 20 
2.3. EXISTING EVALUATION RESEARCH AND PRACTICES ..................................... 23 
2.3.1. SOCIAL PROGRAM EVALUATION ............................................................... 23 
2.3.2. STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT ........................................... 26 
3.0 EMPIRICAL STUDY ............................................................................................................. 33 
3.1. CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND PROPOSITIONS ............................................................ 34 
3.2. QUALITATIVE EXPLORATION PROCESS .................................................................. 44 
3.3. INTERVIEW FINDINGS AND THEMES ........................................................................ 47 
3.3.1. PART 1: RECONCILING THE EXPECTATIONS AND FEEDBACK ............ 48 
3.3.2. PART 2: INCIDENTAL FINDINGS AND THEMES........................................ 56 
4.0 SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................ 62  
4.1. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH............................................................ 64 
4.2. POLICY IMPLICATIONS................................................................................................. 66 
4.3. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................ 67 
APPENDIX A ................................................................................................................................... 70 
v 
 
APPENDIX B ................................................................................................................................... 72 
APPENDIX C ................................................................................................................................... 74 
APPENDIX D ................................................................................................................................... 76 
APPENDIX E ................................................................................................................................... 90 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................. 98 
  
vi 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1:  LENS OF CIVIL SOCIETY ........................................................................................ 17 
FIGURE 2:  CONCEPTUAL MODEL ............................................................................................ 34 
FIGURE 3:  CONCEPTUAL MODEL WITH SUGGESTED REVISIONS ................................... 57 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the non-profit sector, talking about the social benefits of American philanthropic foundations is like 
talking about motherhood and apple pie – of course foundations benefit society. But do they? How do we 
know?  National surveys indicate that most foundations neither formally evaluate the effectiveness of the 
grants they make nor measure their own organizational performance (Ostrower, 2004; The Center for 
Effective Philanthropy, 2002).  Though a few dedicate considerable resources to evaluating their grantees 
and their own organization, most foundations rely on grantees to self-report project outcomes.   Even 
among foundations that believe independent evaluations of grantees are important, stated priorities do not 
reflect their actual practices (Ostrower, 2004).   
The title of this research paper asks a very broad question about how foundations assess social 
impact.  As suggested in the sub-title, this study focuses more narrowly on understanding foundations’ 
evaluation practices and the forces that motivate their practices.  This approach prompts the specific 
research question explored here, What exogenous and endogenous factors influence the evaluation 
practices
1
 of philanthropic foundations?   
Answering this research question requires an understanding of the current situation, including 
organizational dynamics, the entities that make decisions about evaluation practices, and the experiences 
which shape the lens from which these decision-makers view evaluation practices.  In addition, the 
research process requires a conceptual model to aid predictions about the external or internal forces that 
                                                          
1 For purposes of this research endeavor, “evaluation” encompasses two distinct but inter-dependent management 
practices:  1) project evaluation that focuses on grantee performance relative to a specific project  that receives 
foundation funding, and 2) organizational self-evaluation that focuses on the foundation’s own performance relative 
to its strategic goals, founder’s intent, and measures of overall effectiveness.  The literature often employs the term 
“grantee-focused” evaluation to refer to project evaluation and the term “foundation-focused” evaluation to refer to 
organizational self-evaluation.  In conformity with this approach, this paper uses these terms when needed to 
distinguish between these two types of evaluations. 
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could, or already have, prompted changes to existing practices.  Each of these components is explored 
within this paper.   
Ultimately, the aim of this research endeavor is to help policy-makers inside and outside the 
philanthropic community better understand how to motivate more foundations to adopt robust evaluation 
practices.   The value of this endeavor rests on two fundamental assumptions: 
1. Evaluating performance is valuable not only to the individual foundation, but also to the grantee, 
the philanthropic sector as a whole, the nonprofit sector collectively, and the public at large.   
2. Foundations are accountable to the public.  Though the foundations’ assets are “theirs”, these 
assets are also tax-exempt and paid out at a very slow rate – much more slowly than direct 
contributions to nonprofit organizations – and usually designed to ensure the foundation continues in 
perpetuity. Consequently, contributions to foundations carry a higher social cost and thus are held to a 
higher standard than individual donors’ contributions. 
 
The assertion that evaluation practices will strengthen the philanthropic sector and create public 
value is very much supported in the literature.  In general, the literature expresses the view that without 
evaluation, neither the foundation community nor the public can assess the contribution and effectiveness 
of the philanthropic sector.  Furthermore, without robust evaluation practices, organizational learning 
from philanthropic initiatives is lost, or at best, simply hoarded (Damon & Verducci, 2006; Faber & 
McCarthy, 2008; Fleishman, 2007; Goldberg, 2009; Grassley, 2009; Porter & Kramer, 1999).   There is 
also the view that evaluating performance is an important public accountability. In particular, the 
charitable tax exemption is commonly cited as evidence that American society expects foundations to use 
their assets to achieve the greatest possible benefit (Fleishman, 2007; Porter & Kramer, 1999; Salamon, 
2002a).  Therefore, understanding how to motivate more foundations to adopt these practices is an 
important research objective. 
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To that end, the first section of this paper examines several streams of literature that have 
contributed to understanding this research problem, including network analysis, innovation studies, 
stakeholder theory, and institutional theory.  This section briefly chronicles each of these theories.  It 
includes a more extensive discussion of institutional theory, since this framework underlies the conceptual 
model used here to explore the factors causing institutional change.   
  The literature review also highlights important debates and trends in American philanthropy 
through the writings of thought leaders from the field.  This section concludes with a brief discussion of 
evaluation, both in terms of social program evaluation (which focuses on grantees), as well as strategic 
performance management/evaluation (which focuses on the foundations themselves).   
The second section of this paper describes a conceptual model and preliminary propositions.  The 
model, developed by Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, is rooted in institutional theory and details six 
stages of institutional change (2002).   From the literature and the Greenwood et al model emerge five 
preliminary propositions, or “expectations”, about the factors that might impact institutional change (and 
inertia) relative to evaluation practices in the philanthropic sector.  The next section summarizes the 
results of key informant interviews with representatives of eight foundations headquartered in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, on the topic of evaluation practices.  This discussion also reconciles the expectations with 
the input from key informants and discusses other findings that were interesting but incidental.  In the 
concluding section, the paper revisits the research question, key assumptions, and opportunities for future 
research.  This closing discussion highlights important implications for policy-makers seeking to motivate 
more foundations to adopt robust evaluation practices.   
 
1.1  TIMELINESS OF RESEARCH ENDEAVOR 
As popularized by 12-step recovery programs, the first step to overcoming a problem is admitting that 
you have one.  In 1999, two scathing articles, one of which appeared in the Harvard Business Review, 
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lamented foundations’ sorry record on both grantee- and foundation-focused evaluation (Easterling & 
Csuti, 1999; Porter & Kramer, 1999).  A Colorado Trust report stated, “…foundations most often direct 
their evaluations at the activities of their grantees, only rarely subjecting themselves to the same level of 
scrutiny, accountability, and discomfort” (Easterling & Csuti, 1999).  Adding to this censure, Michael 
Porter and Mark Kramer asserted that, “Until foundations accept their accountability to society and meet 
their obligation to create value, they exist in a world where they cannot fail.  Unfortunately, they also 
cannot truly succeed” (1999).  These are just two of the many voices from inside and outside the 
foundation community forcefully proclaiming that the philanthropic sector has at least one problem:  
inadequately evaluating its effectiveness (Brest & Harvey, 2008; Damon & Verducci, 2006; Faber & 
McCarthy, 2008; Fleishman, 2007; Salamon, 2002a).     
Inside the foundation community, the growing “venture philanthropy” movement has fueled 
enthusiasm for robust evaluation practices, and foundation CEOs are concerned about regulatory scrutiny 
if they fail to demonstrate social value (The Center for Effective Philanthropy, 2002).   Outside the 
foundation community, policy-makers are asking about accountability and transparency as foundations 
have grown, not only in numbers and asset size, but also in influence (Faber & McCarthy, 2008; 
Fleishman, 2007; Grassley, 2009; Salamon, 2002a).  Joel Fleishman posits that the public attention 
generated by Warren Buffet’s decision to bequest the bulk of his wealth to the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation and increased criticism from public officials might “generate enthusiasm” within the 
foundation community for serious self-regulation (Fleishman, 2007).  Pointed public comments by key 
Congressional leaders and White House staff suggest the possibility of increased scrutiny and regulation.  
In 2009, Senator Charles Grassley, ranking member of the Finance Committee, stated his position: 
“We believe in strengthening the charitable sector by making charities more accountable for the 
significant tax breaks bestowed on them in the tax code.  This year marks the 40
th
 anniversary of 
the enactment of the 1969 private foundation rules.  In these 40 years, we have seen explosive 
growth in charities and charitable giving.  What we haven‟t seen, though is the law, and the 
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enforcement of the law, keeping up with that growth…. The question of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the tax breaks for giving to charity is an important one” (Grassley, 2009).  
 
In March 2010, the White House aired its related concerns: 
“Sonal Shah, head of the White House's Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation, 
urged foundations to take greater risks… She also said that much of her work has been hobbled 
by a lack of detailed data and statistics about nonprofit groups and how public policies affect 
them and the people they serve. Without reliable data, she says, it is often hard for her and her 
colleagues to get support for ideas that might help nonprofit groups” (The Chronicle of 
Philanthropy, 2010). 
 
The recent recession may have temporarily quelled regulatory attempts for two reasons.  One, the 
economic downturn diminished the value of foundation assets, deflecting claims about abundant wealth.  
Two, public officials may not want to constrain private philanthropists when the jobless rate signals a vast 
need for continued social program innovation and support. Yet history suggests that foundation oversight 
will not go away and will likely re-emerge with a strengthening economy (Byrnes, 2004).     
Anticipating ongoing attention to the issue of public accountability, a variety of organizations and 
consultants has emerged with evaluation tools and strategies.  In addition, several noted universities, 
including the University of Pittsburgh, have created Centers of Excellence to support research in the field 
of philanthropy (see Appendix A).  The rise of the venture philanthropy movement has also increased 
attention on philanthropic performance metrics and expanded the foundation lexicon to include “social 
return of investment”, “patient capital”, “social investing”, “social entrepreneurship”, and other impact-
oriented terms.    However, there is ample evidence that most foundations have not yet adopted evaluation 
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practices that focus on either grantees (“grantee-focused evaluation”) or the foundations themselves 
(“foundation-focused evaluation”) (Grantmakers for Effective Organizations, 2006; Ostrower, 2004; The 
Center for Effective Philanthropy, 2002, 2006).  Even among foundations which believe evaluation is 
important, there is a significant gap between stated priorities and actual practices (Ostrower, 2004).  This 
finding presents evidence that professing belief does not necessarily translate into action.   
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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The central research question explored in this paper is, “What exogenous and endogenous factors 
influence the evaluation practices of philanthropic foundations?”  A comprehensive analysis of this 
question requires a thorough understanding of institutional dynamics (the framework), American 
philanthropic foundations (the context), and the field of evaluation research itself (the tool).  This section 
begins by discussing several important social theories that inform understanding of institutional 
dynamics, including innovation studies, network theory, stakeholder theory, organizational change, and 
institutional theory.  Since the research question explores the relationship between philanthropic 
foundations and the practice of evaluation, the literature review also highlights important issues in both 
philanthropy and evaluation before discussing the intersection of these distinct domains.   
 
2.1 INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS 
The fields of economics, political science, and sociology weave a rich tapestry of perspectives on 
institutional dynamics.  In combination, these fields elucidate understanding of individual behavior, 
which have evolved into tools for understanding organizational behavior.   For purposes of this research 
endeavor, the unit of analysis is the organization, as well as the field.  As a result, innovation studies, 
network theory, and stakeholder theory, while providing important insights,  fall short because the unit of 
analysis employed by these theories is primarily the individual (with innovation and network studies) or 
the relationship between the individual and the organization (with stakeholder theory).  Institutional 
theory provides a more robust platform for analyzing organizational behavior, relative to the organization 
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and the field as a whole.  Therefore, the primary focus of this literature review is institutional theory.   
However, the particular insights of the other theories which inform this discussion are also included here.  
 
Innovation Studies and Network Analysis 
In 1962, Everett Rogers published Diffusion of Innovations, a seminal work from which grew the 
field of innovation studies.  Now in its fifth edition (2003), Rogers’ work is widely cited in the social 
sciences2 to explain the adoption of innovations, ranging from technology to politics to health.  The 
importance of Rogers’ pioneering work, which categorizes individuals along a spectrum of innovators, 
early adopters, and late adopters, cannot be overstated.  This contribution informs understanding of the 
factors which influence the diffusion and adoption of innovations and has a wide variety of applications.  
Rogers’ contribution is particularly useful in understanding the diffusion of management practices, 
including the spread of evaluation practices in the philanthropic community.  
Yet there remains a tension between the diffusion dynamics of individuals, as opposed to those of 
organizations.  Rogers acknowledges that the organization is more complex, given that adoption and 
implementation are not one in the same.  That is, the adoption decision may be made by the organization, 
but the implementation requires many individuals to act collectively.  Early research in the area of 
organizational innovation found some similarities to individual innovation, but also some key differences.  
For example, these studies found low correlations between independent and dependent variables, and 
researchers faced significant data collection challenges.  In combination, these dynamics initially 
discouraged work in the field (Rogers, 1995).   Rogers’ discussion of organizational complexities 
underscores the importance of understanding actual (implemented) practices, as opposed to stated 
(adopted) priorities.   
                                                          
2
 29,907 citations recorded by Google Scholar as of October 25, 2010. 
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Over the last decade, the field of innovation studies has leveraged institutional theory to 
understand how innovation evolves within a particular field or sector system.  To investigate these 
dynamics, Frank Geels makes an insightful distinction between the “supply side” of innovation (the tool) 
and the “user side” of innovation (the diffusion and use of the tool) (Geels, 2004).  Geels asserts that 
innovation studies has focused on the development of knowledge (the technology or tool) and 
downplayed the importance of the user side (the social infrastructure which influences the diffusion and 
use of the tool).   
Geels believes that the user side of the equation is critically important to understanding 
institutional adoption of innovations.  The implication of this finding is that the users’ trust in the 
quality of the technology limits the adoption of the technology.  Most work in the field of evaluation has 
focused on developing the tools, rather than educating users.  This is especially important relative to the 
use of evaluation practices in foundations.  Practitioner-users may have significant concerns about the 
ability of evaluation tools to capture both short-term and long-term impacts.  This is likely a factor 
influencing the adoption of both grantee- and foundation-focused evaluation practices.   
The field of innovation studies is linked closely with network analysis.  Network theory focuses 
on the influence of strong and weak ties between individuals.  Going back to the early work of Everett 
Rogers gives evidence that the experience of friends and early adopters influences the adoption of 
innovation more than objective data or research (Rogers, 1995).  The relationship between individual ties 
and diffusion led to a connection between innovation studies and network analysis.  The relationship 
between the diffusion of innovation and network theory is a discussion in and of itself.   
For purposes of this research initiative, the critical contribution of network analysis is the role 
networks play in confining and diffusing organizational practices, such as evaluation practices.  Network 
theory helps explain how information spreads.  However, it does not provide a wholly sufficient 
explanation of why (or how) the institution responds to or processes the information gleaned from the 
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network.  For those insights, we turn to stakeholder theory and the larger body of organizational change 
literature  (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Strang & Meyer, 1993).   
 
2.1.2 Stakeholder Theory 
In the early 1980’s, R. Edward Freeman responded to the tension between network theory and 
institutionalism by developing a thesis of stakeholder influence.  In his initial work on this topic, Strategic 
Management:  A Stakeholder Approach, Freeman explores the fundamental relationship between the actor 
and the organization.  Stakeholder theory is now featured as an essential framework in business ethics and 
corporate social responsibility texts (Jones & Wicks, 1999).  For purposes of this work, stakeholder 
theory provides another lens from which to consider the factors which motivate foundations to adopt 
evaluation practices.    
  Stakeholder theory provides a bridge between individual and organizational behaviors by 
introducing as a unit of analysis the relationship between the organization and its actors.    In this way, 
stakeholder theory examines the strategies that stakeholders use to exert influence on an organization.  
“The stakeholder approach is about groups and individuals who can affect the organization and is about 
managerial behavior taken in response to those groups and individuals” (Freeman, 1984).   
Stakeholder theory is useful for understanding the motivations of individual decision-makers in 
organizations, but it does not fully address or explain the institutional constraints the decision-makers 
face.  Therefore, what is needed is a framework which shifts the unit of analysis to the organization.  The 
organizational change and adaptation literature provides many such theories.   In particular, one sub-field 
of this literature, institutional theory, provides as especially useful lens for examining the research 
question at hand.   As such, the remainder of the academic literature review discusses both organization 
change and institutional theory in more detail. 
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2.1.2. Organizational Change 
The organizational change literature focuses on understanding the factors that influence organizational 
change (or inertia), as well as the organization’s responsiveness to these influences.  This field of study 
provides a macro-view of organizational dynamics which informs understanding of the factors which 
might influence management practices, including evaluation.  The reigning perspectives share a common 
conceptualization of organizational change which includes looking at the:  1) content of the change 
(“what”); 2) process of changing (“how”); and 3) context of the change (“environmental”) (Armenakis & 
Bedeian, 1999; Barnett & Carroll, 1995).    
Content issues focus on what changes, including organizational strategies (mission/culture), 
leadership, employee skills and behaviors, and internal procedures.  Process issues address how change 
occurs, related to implementation and employee/individual behavioral responses to change.  Contextual 
issues refer to “forces or conditions existing in an organization‟s external or internal environments” 
(Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999).  These conditions include regulatory constraints, peer pressure, and 
organizational experiences with previous change.   
Another important process consideration, related to the source and direction of the change 
initiative, is especially pertinent to this study.  Parsons suggests that there are three levels of authoritative 
hierarchy:  technical, managerial, and institutional (1960).  Hannan and Freeman posit that each of these 
layers within the hierarchy responds differently to inertial forces (1984).  For example, core institutional 
processes will respond more slowly than peripheral changes to technical processes.  Furthermore, they 
assert that changes at the institutional level generally trigger changes at the technical and managerial 
levels, but that the reverse does not always hold true.   
This perspective has several important implications for this study.  First, it suggests that the 
motivations which prompt grantee-focused evaluations (technical processes) may be different than the 
motivations that lead to foundation-focused evaluation (core institutional processes).  Second, it suggests 
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that some changes will be “easier” than others.   That is, grantee-focused evaluations that simply require 
technical procedures to change (i.e. program officers allocating their time differently) will occur more 
easily than foundation-focused evaluation, which gets at core institutional identity and mission (i.e. How 
do we measure success?).    
This theoretical view supports the approach used in this study to separately consider grantee- and 
foundation-focused evaluation practices, since each impact level may respond to different motivational 
forces, or perhaps respond differently to the same motivational forces.  This framework also supports the 
intuitive notion that foundation-focused evaluation will require grantee-focused evaluations, but that the 
reverse may not necessarily hold true.  
To hone in on a specific approach to understanding institutional change, the sub-field of 
organizational change literature most applicable to this study is that of institutional theory.  Institutional 
theory provides a framework to analyze both internal and external mechanisms that prompt organizational 
change.  This is especially important for a study of private foundations, since external mechanisms are 
somewhat weak:  foundations are usually endowed for perpetuity, are not heavily regulated, and are not 
embroiled in competitive markets (Damon & Verducci, 2006; Fleishman, 2007; Porter & Kramer, 1999; 
Salamon, 2002a).   
 
2.1.3. Institutional Theory 
The common housefly sees the world not through one lens, but through a compound lens, constructed of 
many tiny lenses.  Though this perspective produces a somewhat fuzzy mosaic, it outperforms the human 
eye’s singular lens by providing a rich, 360 degree perspective on its environment (Goldsmith, 2010).  In 
many ways, the diversity of disciplines contributing to the scholarly literature on institutional theory 
provides a compound lens from which to view the field.  Institutional theory is a complex literature, with 
roots in political science, sociology, and economics.  Each field has branded particular attributes of the 
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institution, yet share the common objective of explaining why institutions change (Clemens & Cook, 
1999; Hall & Taylor, 1996).  Fuzzy as it may be, the contributions of these diverse perspectives construct 
a rich perspective on institutional dynamics which greatly enhances understanding of the institutional 
constraints and rules which define decision-making options and management practices.  These 
institutional constraints and rules determine not only how foundations evaluate grantees but also how 
(and if) the foundation evaluates its own performance.   Therefore, institutional theory is extremely 
relevant to this research endeavor. 
Due to its multi-faceted history, the key concepts and ideas about institutional theory are 
expressed in at least three unique dialects.  It is not surprising, then, that the definition of “institution” 
itself varies somewhat across these social science fields.  For example, political science tends to view 
institutions as formal laws and monolithic state entities, whereas sociologists have expanded the 
definition to include culturally and cognitively developed organizations and actions (Clemens & Cook, 
1999).   
Even within the field of sociology, there are a variety of definitions of institutional theory.  W. 
Richard Scott highlights four different approaches, which generally vary based on the degree to which 
they incorporate history and instill values, but each commonly defines institutionalization as “…a social 
process by which individuals come to accept a shared definition of social reality” (Scott, 1987; Scott & 
Meyer, 1994).  Another commonly-held view is that within institutionalism “the patterning of social life 
is not produced solely by the aggregation of individual and organizational behavior but also by 
institutions that structure actions” (Clemens & Cook, 1999). 
 In addition, each social science approaches institutionalism differently.  Economists look for 
rationality and equilibriums, political scientists look for the role of the state or other formal institutions, 
and sociologists look for culturally bound behaviors, or “taken for granted” assumptions.  However, 
central to each school of thought are two fundamental questions: 
14 
 
1. What causes institutions to change?  
2. What is the relationship between institutions and individual behavior? (Clemens & Cook, 1999; 
Hall & Taylor, 1996) 
 
These are intriguing and important questions, pondered even outside the walls of academia, as 
evidenced by “pop culture” business literature.  Both Maxwell Gladden and Bill Bridges have popularized 
the theoretical construct of institutionalism through their respective conceptionalizations of “tipping 
points” and “transition management” (Bridges, 2003; Gladden, 2000).  Gladden’s approach depends on 
exceptional personalities introducing and influencing the adoption of trends.  However, he doesn’t 
adequately explain how a fashion or fad becomes institutionalized.   
Bridges approach is more inclusive, asserting that everyone faces constant change, and that 
success comes not from managing “a” change event, but from adeptly moving, or transitioning, from one 
change to the next.  Following the lead of the “adaptation” school of organizational change theory, 
Bridges’ notion parallels evolutionary biology:  adaptation is essential for survival.  However, 
evolutionary theory is not a compelling motivation for those working in a heavily endowed, self-
perpetuating foundation.  Therefore, neither of these pop culture perspectives satisfactorily addresses the 
core research question at hand.   
In fact, the under-lying question, What causes institutional change?, is a difficult one to answer 
and currently lacks consensus.  Simply stated, the academic debate centers around the question of whether 
change occurs primarily through exogenous jolts or through endogenous shifts in interests.  The other 
important and fundamentally related question, What is the relationship between institutions and 
individual behavior?, also lacks consensus.  Scholars who emphasize the constraints of institutional rules 
tend to favor the belief that exogenous jolts are needed to provoke institutional change.   From the field of 
sociology, both DiMaggio and Scott adhere to this particular notion.  DiMaggio suggests there is a 
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threshold after which an organization’s decision to adopt a new practice is often driven by the legitimacy 
conferred by adoption, rather than a rational analysis of whether or not the new practice provides 
economic advantage (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
  Scott also emphasizes the role of exogenous factors on institutional change.  “Actions are a 
function of the environment of the institution, not autonomous choices, motivations or purposes generated 
internally” (Scott & Meyer, 1994).  Taking this argument one step further, Scott goes on to assert that 
institutions not only influence the behavior of actors, but that “institutions create actors” (Scott & Meyer, 
1994).  However, Scott does not strip agency completely away from actors, noting that actors and groups 
of actors do have the ability to influence and control institutional rules (Scott, 1987). 
At the other side of the debate are scholars, including Kathleen Thelen, who believe that 
individuals are not tightly constrained by institutional rules.  Thelen’s perspective on rules is that “rules 
are never „simply‟ applied, they are always interpreted, enforced and enacted, and, of course, by actors 
who have divergent and conflicting interests” (Thelen, 2009).  As such, Thelen asserts that transformative 
change need not be abrupt, but can occur over time with shifts in the interests and composition of the 
political coalition upon which the institution rests.  For example, exogenous changes can empower new 
actors within the institution, who gradually convert existing institutions to align with their interests 
(Thelen, 2000). In this way, exogenous change can prompt endogenous change.  She also disagrees with 
those who attempt to distinguish between periods of institutional stability and institutional change (i.e. 
punctuated equilibrium theorists).  Instead, she conceptualizes institutions as constantly evolving.  Thelen 
expresses the crux of her argument as follows: 
“My claim here is that scholars working within frameworks that conflate conceptually the 
institution and the behavior under that institution will find it hard to develop an account of 
change that leaves room for conflict and agency.  They will find it difficult to see how change 
could ever be generated endogenously, instead, change will seem always to require an exogenous 
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shock or shift that causes the old institution to break down and that creates an opening…By 
focusing on the political coalitions….we open up room for talking about strategy, conflict, and 
agency as important all the time and not just in those rare moments when structures break down 
entirely” (Thelen, 2009). 
 
Testing these competing perspectives on institutional changes requires specific contextual 
information about the particular institution or field.  Therefore, moving forward with this research 
endeavor requires stepping back to understand the context of philanthropy in general and the American 
philanthropic movement in particular. 
 
2.2 PHILANTHROPY AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
From an academic perspective, philanthropy finds expression in the same three scholarly disciplines 
which have contributed to the development of institutional theory:  economics, political science, and 
sociology.   Martti Muukkonen constructs a lens of civil society which integrates these three perspectives 
with regard to both philanthropy and institutionalism.  As depicted in Figure 1, Muukkonen views 
philanthropy as an institution that emerged from the gaps left between state, market, family, and religious 
institutions (2009).   
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FIGURE 1:  LENS OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most of the philanthropy literature is dominated by two, somewhat parallel discussions of 
economic incentives and power relationships.  Though the purpose of this paper is not to explicitly 
explore economic incentives or power relationships, one unifying theme running through this literature is 
tension.  The economic incentives and power relationships reference tensions that exist between 
philanthropy and other institutions (the state, grantees, the market, etc.).   
Muukkonen’s graphic clearly depicts the source of this tension:  border disputes with other 
institutional spheres.  Institutional theory supports this view.  According to institutional theory, conflicts 
arise when (and where) institutional spheres intersect because each institution (i.e. philanthropy, the state, 
society) has its own ideas about the appropriate relationship between institutions, its own ideas about the 
institutional rules which should govern different activities, and its own perspective on which institution 
should direct which activities (Scott, 1987).   
Institutional theory suggests that each institutional sphere is guided by different institutional rules 
(or logics).  For example, Friedland and Alford explain that “…the institutional logic of capitalism is 
accumulation…the state‟s is..the regulation of human activity…the family is community…” (Scott, 1987).  
These competing institutional logics explain why tensions occur when institutional spheres intersect.  
Philanthropy 
Market 
Family 
Religious 
Institutions 
State 
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Institutional theory, coupled with Muukkonen’s civil society framework, helps elucidate the source of 
conflicts within the field of philanthropy.  Since the institution of philanthropy itself rests on the margins 
of four institutions, each fundamental to most societies, conflicts over institutional roles and logics are 
inevitable and likely recur with every equilibrium shift.  This perspective suggests that institutional 
conflicts are to be expected at the margin of institutional boundaries.  Contributions from the field of 
complex adaptive systems supports this view, with evidence that emergence and innovation comes from 
the boundaries of existing fields (J. H. Miller & Page, 2007).  It may be that these conflicts are the most 
efficient means of challenging static equilibriums. 
In this way, Muukkonen’s lens helps to explain not only the tensions between institutional 
spheres, but also why so many disciplines have engaged in research about philanthropy:   economists 
discuss market failures, political scientists debate the role of philanthropy in a democratic state; 
sociologists assess power relationships between grantor and grantee; and sociologists and psychologists 
both discuss the institutional short-comings of family and faith.   
Muukkonen’s construct also explains why the field of philanthropy continues to be dynamic:  as 
institutional roles change, so does the philanthropy.  For example, early philanthropists provided for very 
basic human needs, but as the state increased the public safety net, philanthropists shifted their attention 
to public services the state didn’t provide, such as mental health counseling, etc.  (Roberts, 1984).   Also, 
as family ties and the role of religious institutions have evolved, so has philanthropy.  For example, many 
children now receive “character education” (values such as tolerance, responsibility, and perseverance) in 
school or through after-school programs (often funded by private foundation grants), rather than at home 
or through religious education.   
 
  
19 
 
2.2.1 Private Philanthropy in America 
As foretold by De Tocqueville’s famous observation about Americans’ unique disposition to voluntary 
associations, philanthropy is embedded not only in American social policy, but also in the American 
psyche and common law (Byrnes, 2004; Schramm, 2006; Tocqueville, 1835).   This is evidenced by the 
high rate of volunteerism and giving in the United States (Giving U.S.A., 2010; Independent Sector, 
2001).  Even through turbulent economic times, private giving in 2009 remained above two percent of 
gross domestic product (2.1% GDP to be exact), which is about three times as much as the next highest 
country, the United Kingdom (Fleishman, 2007; Giving U.S.A., 2010).  Of the $303.75b given in 2009, 
83% came from individual gifts and bequests, 12.5% from private foundations, and 4.5% from corporate 
foundations (Giving U.S.A., 2010).    
In this context, foundation giving appears trivial.  However, there are approximately 75,000 
foundations in the United States, with assets estimated at $682 billion (The Foundation Center, 2009).   
Furthermore, the assets of the philanthropic sector are concentrated in a relatively small number of 
foundations (The Foundation Center, 2010).  In addition, several unique attributes enable foundations to 
use their wealth and non-financial assets to impact social and economic problems and policies (Brest & 
Harvey, 2008; Faber & McCarthy, 2008; Goldberg, 2009; Schramm, 2006).  These dynamics make the 
study of philanthropic foundations particularly interesting and also provide foundations with the ability to 
play a unique role in society. 
The convergence of several key factors suggests that private foundations will continue to play an 
influential role in American social policy.  These factors include: 
1. The increasing concentration of wealth. In the United States, the top one percent of the 
population owns more than 40% of the wealth and contributes one-third of total charitable 
dollars.  It is projected that in the coming years, households earning more than $1 million will 
provide 50% to 66% of charitable giving (Ostrander, 2007).   
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2. The spectacular growth in foundation assets.  Over the past 30 years, foundation assets 
increased 1,000%.  Since 2000, the growth in new foundations has continued to spiral, at nearly 
three times the growth rate of the mid-1990s (Faber & McCarthy, 2008).  
 
3. The trend for government agencies to “contract out” the provision of direct services to 
nonprofits.   Though government revenues and fees are rising, the typical contract doesn’t cover 
the full cost of services, making nonprofits more dependent on contributions to keep delivering 
services (Salamon, 2002a).  As a result, the foundations which support these nonprofit 
organizations have come to play a more influential role in social policy development and 
implementation, by exercising the “power of the purse” over nonprofit strategies and activities 
(Salamon, 2002b; Silver, 2004).   
 
2.2.2. Institutional Tensions 
The role foundations play in America generates admiration as well as suspicion.   Consistent with the old 
adage, “With great freedom comes great responsibility”, the manner in which foundations operate has 
prompted a long-standing debate surrounding the legitimacy and accountability of the philanthropic sector 
(Fleishman, 2007; Salamon, 2002a; Schramm, 2006).  Institutional theory provides a framework for 
understanding the source of these tensions.   
One source of tension is the absence of competitive market forces, tight regulatory oversight, or 
formal sanctioning mechanisms.  While foundations are not completely isolated from the market, they are 
certainly unique.  Classic market theory relies on the fundamental principles of supply and demand.  Most 
foundations have endowments which provide a steady supply of revenue; all face highly inelastic demand 
for their resources.  While philanthropic foundations may benignly compete with each other for 
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breakthrough ideas and models, they generally function independently and even cooperatively in some 
cities.  Therefore, classic market theory does not hold.   
In general, foundations also operate outside the constraints of direct political action.   While 
foundations are subject to government oversight, the general consensus is that the present regulations are 
minimal.  Philanthropic institutions are not tightly constrained by either coercive forces or formal 
sanctioning mechanisms.  In combination, these institutional dynamics are unique, leading several 
academics to describe foundations as “out of market” entities (Porter & Kramer, 1999; Salamon, 2002a; 
Schramm, 2006).   
Another source of tension is the entrepreneurial spirit of philanthropic institutions. Political 
scientist and economist Joseph Schumpeter based his economic theories on the premise that entrepreneurs 
play a necessary role, disrupting the “static equilibrium toward which social institutions gravitate” 
(Schramm, 2006).  According to this view, entrepreneurial activity pushes organizations off sub-optimal 
to more optimal equilibriums (Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar, & Simone de Colle, 2010).  Carl 
Schramm asserts that  in American society, “the foundation plays the role of institutional entrepreneur, 
challenging other social institutions” (Schramm, 2006).    
Here it is important to note that while entrepreneurs are generally admired by historians, they are 
often disliked by their contemporaries.  By definition, entrepreneurs challenge the status quo and existing 
power structures.  This makes many uncomfortable, if not suspicious.  This is not to say that the criticism 
directed at philanthropy is unwarranted.  At the beginning of the 20th century, Jane Addams, a generous 
social advocate herself, expressed concern that charitable giving is in conflict with democratic principles.  
In more recent years, noted scholar Lester Salamon has taken wealthy donors to task for “philanthropic 
paternalism”, which he believes creates “undemocratic” relationships because control is taken out of the 
hands of recipients (Ostrander, 2007).   Another scholar, William Damon, asserts that foundations’ 
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independence has resulted in a field without a codified domain of practices.  He views this as a serious 
issue for philanthropy.   
“When a field lacks a domain of knowledge and standards to ground it, people working in the 
field have no means of agreeing upon what counts as success or failure…they cannot learn 
lessons from each others‟ experiences, they cannot devise regular ways of training new 
practitioners, and they cannot establish common metrics for evaluating their practices.  The 
result is a field that is unable to gauge its own shortcomings and to thereby lead itself toward 
progressive change” (Damon & Verducci, 2006).   
 
Others cite the potential benefits of philanthropic initiatives lost through poorly executed 
strategies, lack of evaluation studies, and lack of knowledge-sharing (Damon & Verducci, 2006; Faber & 
McCarthy, 2008; Goldberg, 2009). 
These institutional tensions reveal themselves in social and tax policy-making arenas.  Social 
policy-makers are wary of the growing power of foundations in an era of “contracting out” and 
increasingly concentrated wealth.  Tax policy-makers are focused on revenues lost to institutional 
philanthropy.  They believe that contributions to foundations carry a higher social cost than an 
individual’s charitable gift to a nonprofit organization that provides direct social benefits.   This is 
because foundation assets are paid out slowly over time, whereas gifts to nonprofits provide relatively 
immediate and direct social benefit.  As calculated by Porter and Kramer, these dynamics mean that the 
Treasury lost “75 cents for every dollar foundations given to social enterprises” during the 1990’s  
(1999). 
 Collectively, these perspectives raise important questions about accountability and continue to 
fuel debate about the role of foundations in general.   In isolation, even robust evaluation practices will 
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not quiet these controversies, but such practices can provide the information needed to better understand 
the overall social impact of philanthropy.  
 
2.3 EXISTING EVALUATION RESEARCH AND PRACTICES 
For purposes of this research exercise, evaluation includes social program evaluation (focused on the 
grantees), as well as strategic performance management (focused on the foundations’ own performance).  
This section examines the rise of social program evaluation as a field, trends in strategic performance 
management, and the perspectives of philanthropic thought leaders on both grantee- and foundation-
focused evaluation. 
 
2.3.1 Social Program Evaluation 
The field of evaluation research exploded in response to the Johnson Administration’s “war on 
poverty” and the many social experiments it spawned.  At that time, evaluation enjoyed widespread 
support.  Evaluation was most often promoted as a powerful tool for leveraging collective learning in the 
field.  This perspective is best expressed by this comment: 
 “Social problems have plagued civilization from time immemorial.  Determined attempts to deal 
with these problems have been launched repeatedly…Much painful experience has been acquired 
from each new attempt but such experience has rarely been in a form readily available and useful 
to those initiating new programs…” (Sze & Hopps, 1974). 
 
The Great Society initiatives funded large-scale field studies that are still used today to validate 
theories of change.  This is especially true of early childhood studies.  However, during the Reagan 
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administration, evaluation research floundered through funding cuts, although issues in methodology and 
timeliness (the studies took too long) had already muddled the field (D. C. Miller & Salkind, 2002).  
However, the most significant obstacle was the inability of researchers to conduct randomized controlled 
experimental designs – the gold standard of evaluation research.  In response, quasi-experimental designs 
grew more prominent, but ultimately they too faced challenges, particularly the need for long time-series 
of data and an array of threats to validity (D. C. Miller & Salkind, 2002; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 
2002). 
Today, many advocates of evaluation continue to emphasize its value to field learning.  Others 
have shifted the focus on evaluation from field learning to capturing social impact.  Joel Fleischman 
defines impact as “…the extent to which such inputs and outputs have actually changed society, creating 
new viable institutions, generating new knowledge, creating opportunities, and improving social welfare 
generally” (Fleishman, 2007).  However, measuring the impact of social programs is easier said than 
done.  These longitudinal studies require both sophisticated tools and sophisticated skills:  quantitative 
data needed to capture social impact and the skills needed to interpret the data.   
As a result, the field of evaluation research continues to face its own unique set of fundamental 
issues, and even the evaluation literature reflects a range of opinions about the viability of evaluation 
tools.  The central debate is whether evaluation can adequately measure the impact of one particular 
social program that operates in a complex social system.       
A related concern is that measuring outcomes may be focusing on the wrong thing:  individuals 
rather than social systems (Smith & Brandon, 2008; Sze & Hopps, 1974).  This debate ties back into 
institutional theory because it suggests that actors developing and evaluating social programs are 
constrained by institutional logics which hinder creative solutions to both social policy and evaluation.  
(Sze & Hopps, 1974; Weiss, 1972).  As examples, Sze and Hopps cite four “institutional and human 
predicaments” that they believe threaten the viability of evaluation findings.  These problems include: 
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1. The difficulty in defining social problems and hence goals of social programs; 
2. The difficulty in maintaining objectivity; 
3. The difficulty in avoiding contamination by social and human constraints; and 
4. Organizational and institutional forces exerted on the researcher (1974). 
 
Taking this argument one step further leads to this view “…targeted impact evaluation directs 
our attention away from these (institutional) relationships, and…rivets (our attention) on a target 
population of problem people” (Sze & Hopps, 1974).    This perspective suggests that the theories of 
change employed by social innovations may operate within the constraints of institutional structures, 
rather than in attempts to change them.  These logic models carry with them the “taken for granted 
assumptions” that place the burden on individuals rather than broader social and institutional systems.  
The recent literature suggests that this controversy, manifest in debates about evaluation theory, method, 
practice, and profession, has not yet been resolved (Smith & Brandon, 2008). 
Obstacles to evaluation include not only the systematic tools but also ethical dilemmas.  A recent 
survey of Council of Foundation members provides evidence of these challenges.  This study found that 
one-third of survey respondents who had worked with evaluators faced ethical challenges.  These 
challenges were characterized by disagreements with the evaluation findings (positive and negative), 
ownership of the evaluation findings, and conflicts of interest (Morris, 2007). 
Collectively, the evidence from the field suggests that even evaluation researchers recognize the 
cost and implementation challenges inherent in social program evaluation tools.  Researchers are 
increasingly interested in qualitative methods to develop narratives and uncover unintended 
consequences.  However, policy-makers continue to demand quantitative data to substantiate costly social 
program investments.  This too generates tension between evaluation researchers, evaluators, funders, and 
policy-makers.   
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Nonetheless, several national foundations have employed viable and robust evaluation tools and 
approaches (Brest & Harvey, 2008; Isaacs & Colby, 2010).  Reflecting back on the contribution of Frank 
Geels, it is interesting to note that in these institutions there is focus on both the tools (development of 
knowledge) and the application (use of the knowledge) (Geels, 2004).   In most of the evaluation research 
literature, there seems to be a disconnect between those developing the tools and those who use them.  
The literature focuses almost entirely on the tool.  There is very little attention paid to those who use 
them.  This disconnect likely contributes to the slow diffusion of evaluation practices in the field as a 
whole. 
Another constraint that likely limits diffusion of evaluation may be that it just isn’t very exciting 
and may not be a core competency of either foundation staff or grantees.  Their strengths may be 
identifying new ideas and implementing them, rather than evaluating them.  This suggests that 
foundations with robust evaluation practices may have not only more organizational enthusiasm for 
evaluation, but also a different composition of skills in their respective staffs.  Whatever their approach, it 
is extraordinarily wise but unfortunately unusual.   
 
2.3.2. Strategic Performance Management 
Most everyone would agree that attention to organizational performance is beneficial.  As documented in 
the bibliography, there is a rapidly growing body of work promoting the virtues and value of foundation-
focused evaluation, including websites, books, reports, and scholarly articles.  While there are debates 
about the ability of evaluation tools to capture social program impact, there is generally more confidence 
in tools that capture organizational performance.  However, “the devil is in the details.”  While the 
unquestionable motive of private sector corporations is profitability and shareholder return, quantifying 
success outside of the private sector has proven much more challenging.  Michael Porter, Robert Kaplan, 
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Mark Moore, and Bernard Marr are noted leaders in this field and each has taken a somewhat unique 
approach to performance management outside of the private sector (Scherer, 2009).   
One outcome of translating organizational performance is a new paradigm of organizational 
purpose.  According to Moore, non-profit organizations (including foundations) should measure not only 
their individual performance, but also their contribution to their respective fields (Moore, 2000).  Thought 
leaders in the philanthropic community emphatically agree (Brest & Harvey, 2008; Fleishman, 2007; 
Isaacs & Colby, 2010; Porter & Kramer, 1999).   
During the last decade, strategic performance management has become an imperative for the non-
profit sector.   Foundations are very much responsible for this trend, as many require strategic plans and 
performance metrics as a condition of funding.   However, national surveys suggest that most foundations 
have not embraced this approach for their own organizations (Grantmakers for Effective Organizations, 
2009; Ostrower, 2004; The Center for Effective Philanthropy, 2002). 
The apparent lack of strategic performance management within foundations is, if not disturbing, 
at least ironic. (Damon & Verducci, 2006; Easterling & Csuti, 1999; Fleishman, 2007).  As stated best by 
Fleishman,  “There is the paradox of organizations that devote their efforts to changing society, yet 
rarely seek to measure, or even comprehend, the extend of the changes they actually produce” 
(Fleishman, 2007).  Organizations striving to capture empirical data on evaluation practices include The 
Urban Institute’s Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy, The Center for Effective Philanthropy, and 
Grantmakers for Effective Organizations.  Each of these organizations conducted surveys during the 
2000’s to develop a baseline understanding of how (or, if) foundations measure effectiveness.   Appendix 
B summarizes the key questions, methodologies, and findings of these three studies.   
Though each varied in its specific line of inquiry, these studies shared several over-arching 
themes: 
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 There is no silver bullet.  Even the foundations most engaged in measuring social impact find 
data lacking and struggle to identify proxy indicators.  Evaluation is costly and even foundations 
which value formal evaluation assess only a small portion of the projects they fund. 
 
 Foundations which strive to measure social impact are motivated by both internal 
stakeholders (satisfy boards, improve their grant-making practices) and external stakeholders 
(concerns about regulatory scrutiny, desire to proactively respond to looming political pressures). 
 
 Grantees are frustrated that grant-makers expect them to make community-wide impacts yet 
provide short-term, project-based grants rather than long-term funding and/or operating support. 
 
Among smaller foundations, empirical evidence on evaluation processes is extremely sparse.  
One of the few studies identified for this literature review surveyed philanthropic organizations in and 
around Columbus, Ohio, to understand how these organizations framed mission statements (e.g. internal 
vs. external perspective) and to determine what, if any, process was used to assess mission 
accomplishment (Sheehan, 1996).  Both the response rate and results suggest this was not an important 
issue for these organizations, at least in 1996.  Sheehan’s questionnaire not only had a low response rate, 
15.81%, (which minimizes its generalizability), but also showed that of the few that did respond, only 
13.86% actually used impact measures to assess mission achievement (1996).    
In 2004, the Urban Institute (UI) surveyed all staffed foundations in the U.S. on their attitudes 
and practices about effectiveness.   The UI study did not specifically address organizational mission but 
did find that less than a third of small foundations (less than $10 million in assets) conduct evaluations.  
Of those that did, the primary reason was to determine if the project met its goals (Ostrower, 2004).  
However, both studies struggled with low and likely biased response rates.  In the UI and Sheehan 
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studies, it seems intuitive that the sample is biased, since foundations that saw value in evaluation and 
effectiveness measures were most likely to respond.  
In practice, for most foundations, evaluation, if done at all, is grantee-focused (and conducted by 
the grantees themselves).  This approach to evaluation may lack objectivity because grantees fear that 
failure will negatively influence the likelihood of future funding.  Grantee-led evaluations also fail to 
capture the grant’s impact in the context of the foundation’s overall goals, interests, and contributions to 
the field and/or community.  A recent survey found that even among the nation’s largest 225 foundations, 
only a small percent of grants are formally evaluated.  Broader initiatives to capture the foundation’s 
contribution to an organizational field or its impact on a community are even less common (Ostrower, 
2004; The Center for Effective Philanthropy, 2002).  This is especially problematic, given that attending 
to grantee-focused evaluation places emphasis on grant-making, rather than the over-arching goals of the 
foundation (Isaacs & Colby, 2010).  
Compounding these dilemmas is the unique position of foundation-sponsored initiatives.  In the 
case of private foundations, their connection to the environment is much weaker that the state’s (Isaacs & 
Colby, 2010).  This is evidenced by even a cursory look at foundation grants relative to government 
spending on schools, health care, and other public goods.  There are many other actors involved in large 
scale social change, including independent citizen groups and nonprofits not directly supported by 
foundations. Therefore, changes in socio-economic outcomes cannot be fully attributed to philanthropic 
giving.  Yet the influence philanthropic giving has on social systems is undeniable.   
Evidence supporting this assertion comes from the field of public education.  Between local, 
state, and federal sources, spending on public education is gargantuan – approximately $1.16 trillion  
(U.S. Department of Education, 2009).  In total, foundations granted about $5 billion to public education 
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programs in 20073.  Though foundation dollars seem relatively small, it is interesting to note the impact 
that multi-billion and multi-million dollar grants have on educational institutions.  The most recent 
example is the impact of the Obama Administration’s “Race to the Top” grants.  This pool, capped at $4 
billion (roughly $1 billion less than the amount of foundation grants) has incented a great number of 
states to implement large-scale reforms to make themselves eligible for the “Race to the Top” funds 
(Toppo, 2009; U.S. Department of Education, 2010).   
Locally, much smaller amounts of money have influenced the Pittsburgh Public Schools (PPS).   
In 2002, several local foundations acted in concert to decry the wanting performance of the PPS 
administration and School Board by withdrawing $11 million in funding (Lee, 2002).  This action 
contributed to the realignment of the School Board and Executive Staff, with these same foundations 
ultimately funding a national search for a new superintendent.  More recently, the promise of a $40 
million grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation swayed the Pittsburgh City Teachers Union to 
consider contract changes to include “pay for performance” incentives (Rujumba, 2010).  These examples 
show that even though private dollars are much smaller than public dollars, the targeted nature of these 
funds can have powerful effects on public institutions.   
One, rather controversial, view on why foundations don’t have robust evaluation practices comes 
from Joel Fleishman, who suggests that foundations which don’t measure their impact or share 
information about their goals and strategies are “…less interested in achieving impact than in showing the 
world that their hearts are in the right place” (Fleishman, 2007).  A gentler spin on this is that foundation 
staff are more enthusiastic about looking ahead than looking back.  Also, program  officers may fear that 
a program failure will negatively impact their own career (Damon & Verducci, 2006; Isaacs & Colby, 
2010).  Executive promotion of failure as an “opportunity for learning” can lessen this human tendency, 
but it will likely always be a factor in any evaluation process.  As a result, a negative consequence of 
                                                          
3
 The Foundation Center reported nearly $5 billion going to educational institutions in 2007.  Since The Foundation 
Center captures only grants of $10,000 or more, it understates philanthropic giving by small and mid-sized donors.   
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more robust evaluation practices could be program officers who are even less willing to take risks on new 
social policy approaches and initiatives. 
Another consequence of not evaluating effectiveness is that misguided philanthropy can create 
even greater problems than it is trying to correct.  William Damon asserts that the individualist attitudes 
of private foundations have kept the field from developing a “domain of normative standards”, which he 
believes results in “…a field that is unable to gauge its own shortcomings and thereby lead itself toward 
progressive change.  This is a recipe for ineffectiveness at best and catastrophic failure at worst” 
(Damon & Verducci, 2006).   
Though the dialogue within grant-making associations suggests greater interest in independent 
evaluation, recent evidence is that even foundations’ stated priorities regarding evaluation do not reflect 
their actual practices (Ostrower, 2004).  However, conceding defeat on this issue is not a viable option 
either, especially in the face of accountability movement activists.  In most policy environments, it is no 
longer acceptable to assume that a given social program is good, or that its unintended consequences add 
value greater than the initial objective (Sze & Hopps, 1974; Weiss, 1972).   The challenge is not only 
creating more robust (and affordable) evaluation tools but also addressing users’ concerns and perceptions 
(Geels, 2004).   Many philanthropic foundations and policy think-tanks have overcome at least some of 
these challenges (Brest & Harvey, 2008; Isaacs & Colby, 2010; Smith & Brandon, 2008). 
Although there is much in the literature unabashedly promoting the values and virtues of 
evaluation, there is little attention to actual motives.  The most common explanation for why some 
foundations evaluate and other don’t is expressed in this quote, “…There are no external forces 
compelling foundations to examine their work and assess what worked and what didn‟t;  the motivation 
has to be internal, to come from a desire to achieve excellence…”  (Isaacs & Colby, 2010)   
If this perspective were correct, this research endeavor would be pointless.  However, institutional 
theory gives reason to suspect that institutional change in philanthropic foundations is a much more 
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complex dynamic.  Within an institutional theory framework, the remainder of this paper takes a closer 
look at the factors that influence changes in evaluation practices. 
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3.0 EMPIRICAL PROCESS 
Drawing from the literature, there are three streams of institutionalism which are especially relevant to the 
study of factors which influence changes in foundations’ evaluation practices:  
 Friedland and Alfred’s claim that tensions rise when (and where) institutional spheres intersect 
(Scott, 1987).  As suggested by Muukkonen, philanthropy shares institutional borders with the state, 
the market, the family, and religious organizations (Muukkonen, 2009).  Therefore, it is critical to 
understand the dynamics which occur at these institutional borders.    
 
 Thelen’s perspective on institutionalism, which harnesses the power of conflict and new entrants to 
generate endogenous institutional change (Thelen, 1999, 2000, 2009). 
 
 Schumpeter’s theory of the entrepreneur.  Though not formally associated with institutionalism, 
Schumpeter’s theory is important in this context, given the entrepreneurial role that foundations play 
in American society (Schramm, 2006).   
 
These views suggest that a robust model of the factors influencing change must provide a 
platform for considering the impact of both internal and external influences on organizational behavior, as 
well as the “activities on the margins” which occur between institutional spheres.  Another consideration 
in selecting a model of institutional change is that change in foundations may evolve very slowly.  This is 
due to the fact that foundations are somewhat sheltered from competitive market forces and have not been 
subjected to heavy-handed regulation.  As a result, organizational change may occur very subtly, making 
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it difficult to detect.  This suggests that the model should have several stages prior to diffusion to capture 
incremental changes.  
 
3.1  CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND PROPOSITIONS 
The conceptual model presented by Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings addresses both the 
internal/external dynamics, as well as the expected subtleties of institutional changes.  This model, 
depicted in Figure 2, conceptualizes six stages of institutional change4 (2002).  Four of these changes 
occur prior to diffusion.  This paper primarily focuses on the first three stages.  
 
FIGURE 2:  CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
4
 The model presented by Greenwood et al describes Stage I as “Precipitating Jolts”.  I have expanded this 
definition to include “and Shifts”, to capture the signals of endogenous shifts in political coalitions, as suggested by 
Kathleen Thelen (Thelen, 2000). 
I:  Precipitating Jolts and Shifts 
*Social.  
*Functional/Technological. 
*Regulatory/Political.   
 
“Destabilizes established 
practices” 
VI: Re-institutionalization 
*Cognitive legitimacy 
 
“…the ideas themselves become 
taken-for-granted…” 
II: De-institutionalization 
*Emergence of new players 
*Institutional entrepreneurship 
*Ascendance of existing actors 
 
“Disturbs the…field level 
consensus by introducing new 
ideas and …the possibility of 
change.” 
III: Pre-institutionalization 
*Independent Innovations 
*Technical viability 
 
 “Organizations innovate 
independently, seeking 
technically viable solutions to 
locally perceived problems.” 
V: Diffusion 
*Increasing objectification 
*Pragmatic legitimacy 
 
“Diffusion occurs only if new ideas 
are compellingly presented as 
more appropriate than existing 
practices.” 
Fad or fashion 
IV: Theorization 
*Specification of general 
organizational failing 
*Justification of abstract 
possible solution 
*Moral and/or pragmatic 
legitimacy 
 
“…theoretical accounts 
simplify and distill the 
properties of new 
practices and explain the 
outcomes they produce.” 
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Integrating the literature and this conceptual model with the research question, “What exogenous 
and endogenous factors influence (changes in) the evaluation practices of philanthropic foundations?” 
leads to five propositions, or “expectations”.   Given the preliminary and investigative nature of this study 
and the small sample of key informants, this research endeavor cannot prove or disprove formal 
hypotheses or specific propositions.  However, the process employed here can identify tendencies and 
interesting trends, which could point to opportunities for future research pursuits.  In this spirit, the 
preliminary propositions, perhaps more aptly described as “expectations”, are not tightly bound or 
constrained to a particular stage of the Greenwood et al model but do follow the change dynamics and 
direction it suggests.   
The first expectation addresses foundations’ fundamental attitudes about current evaluation tools 
and practices.  The second expectation relates to the dynamics which could precipitate changes to 
evaluation practices.  The next two expectations focus on the influential drivers of changes to evaluation 
practices.  The fifth and final expectation identifies the organizational characteristics of foundations that 
are more likely to experiment with more robust evaluation practices.  For each of these “expectations”, 
the following discussion examines the support coming from the existing literature and the type of 
evidence from the interviews that might validate (or invalidate) the expectation.    
 
Expectation 1: Attitudes about Evaluation 
Expectation 1:  Foundations do not fully trust the viability of evaluation tools and the usefulness of the 
information that evaluation tools provide. This is a significant barrier to adopting robust evaluation 
practices.  
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 This expectation doesn’t directly relate to the Greenwood et al model, but rather harkens back to 
the literature review and the contributions of Frank Geels (Geels, 2004).  Validation of this expectation 
requires supporting feedback directly from foundation practitioners. 
 
Support from the Literature 
As already discussed, Geels believes that the user side of the equation is critically important to 
understanding institutional adoption of innovations.  The implication of this finding is that the users’ 
trust in the quality of the technology limits the adoption of the technology (Geels, 2004).  Most work in 
the field of evaluation has focused on developing the tools, rather than educating users.   Surveys suggest 
that practitioner-users may have significant concerns about the ability of evaluation tools to capture both 
short-term and long-term impacts.  Recent surveys also imply that even foundations that are very engaged 
in measuring social impact find data lacking and struggle to identify proxy indicators.  These surveys also 
suggest that the costs of grantee-focused evaluation are barriers to adoption (Ostrower, 2004; The Center 
for Effective Philanthropy, 2002, 2006, 2009).  Taken as a whole, these factors are all likely to reduce 
foundation practitioners’ confidence in evaluation tools and results.  This lack of confidence, 
compounded by cost concerns, is likely a factor which negatively influences the adoption of evaluation 
practices. 
 
Expectations 2:  Precipitating Jolts and Shifts 
Expectation 2:  Over time, changes in the evaluation practices of philanthropic foundations will 
predominantly come from endogenous social shifts. Though exogenous regulatory jolts may trigger 
abrupt change in high-level foundation practices, it is less likely that these regulations will directly 
impact evaluation practices.  Regulators are more likely use tax policy to extract larger distributions 
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from foundations than to pursue more drastic measures, such as establishing agencies to monitor the 
performance of philanthropic institutions. 
 
This expectation relates to the first stage of the Greenwood et al model, which focuses on the 
precipitating jolts that destabilize established practices.  The model categorizes the jolts (and in this case, 
the shifts) as social, technological, or regulatory.   Validating this expectation is somewhat retrospective, 
in that it first requires evidence of disruption to existing evaluation practices.  Validating the source of the 
shift as social and endogenous could come through evidence that a foundation took independent action to 
change its evaluation practices.  For example, the foundation might have been dissatisfied with its current 
practices, or it might question its current practices based on information about another foundation’s 
evaluation approach, perhaps gleaned from a social peer network.   Evidence that changes to evaluation 
practices are primarily driven by regulatory interventions would run counter to this expectation. 
 
Support from the Literature 
The philanthropy literature suggests that social and regulatory influences have the greatest 
potential to destabilize established management practices in foundations.   Social influences include the 
growth in concentrated wealth and the persistence of social ills.   The concentration of wealth opens up 
opportunities for shifts in the interests and influence of philanthropic institutions.  New wealth also 
introduces new entrants to the philanthropic community, who bring with them new ideas about evaluation 
practices.   
Another factor is the persistence of social ills, which generates dissatisfaction with the status quo 
and signals that current practices are not meeting current needs.  The growing concern about America’s 
ability to sustain its dominant world position is substantiated by the fact that the United States’ Human 
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Development Index score has fallen relative to other OECD countries, from #2 in the 1970’s to #12 in the 
2000’s (Burd-Sharps, Lewis, & Martins, 2008).  At the local level, a recent report by The Center for Race 
and Social Problems at the University of Pittsburgh documented many such disparities in Allegheny 
County, Pennsylvania (2007).  In combination, concentration of wealth and the persistence of social ills 
are two factors that support the expectation that precipitating changes are both endogenous and social 
shifts. 
Paul Brest and Joel Fleischman, two noted philanthropic thought leaders, believe that either 
regulatory action or the threat of such action is needed to prompt more strategic evaluation practices 
(Brest & Harvey, 2008; Fleishman, 2007).   Their views emphasize the need for exogenous regulatory 
jolts.  However, there is no evidence in the literature that new tax policies would reach down into specific 
management practices or over-ride the board’s management authority.  Historically, government 
regulation has come through tax policy (Byrnes, 2004).  The last significant government intervention 
occurred in the 1969 Tax Act5.   The most recent regulatory change, related to the Internal Revenue 
Service Form 990, was also embedded in tax policy.  Rumblings from Congress and other state actors 
arise sporadically (Grassley, 2009; The Chronicle of Philanthropy, 2010).    
While the current economic dilemmas may have temporarily distracted potential regulators, the 
ongoing need for new revenue sources suggests that tax policy may once again be used to regulate 
foundation activities, by either raising the distribution requirement or somehow reducing tax-deductible 
contributions.  Recent national surveys suggest that foundation executives are concerned about increasing 
oversight and demands (Grantmakers for Effective Organizations, 2009; Ostrower, 2004).  In the current 
political and economic environment, it is possible that regulatory interventions could prompt foundations 
to revisit their general management practices.  However, the expectation is that the regulations would 
probably not directly “jolt” changes to evaluation practices. 
                                                          
5
 The 1969 Tax Act defined private and operating foundations, levied an excise tax on foundation assets, 
established the minimum distribution requirement, expanded the reporting requirements and regulations of all tax 
exempt organizations, and also included other regulations which applied specifically to foundations (Byrnes, 2004). 
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Expectations 3 and 4: Sources of De-institutionalization  
Expectation 3:  Foundation board members, more than staff, initiate changes to evaluation practices.   
 
Expectation 4: Foundation board members initiate changes to evaluation practices because they are 
influenced by private sector measurement practices and seek similar performance metrics for the 
philanthropic institutions they serve. 
 
 These expectations relate to both Stage I and Stage II of the Greenwood et al model.  While Stage 
I addresses precipitating sources, Stage II explores the actual disturbances in the field level consensus.  
The model describes these disturbances as coming from new players, institutional entrepreneurs, and/or 
existing actors who introduce new ideas and the possibility of change.    As with Expectation 2, validating 
these expectations has a retrospective element:  both assume that existing evaluation practices are being 
questioned.   
Validating that the board is the primary source of change is nuanced.  The evidence would need 
to demonstrate that the board initiated a review process, (e.g. a request that staff examine other evaluation 
practices) or that one or more board members independently sought out information about other 
approaches to evaluation practices.  Evidence of staff-initiated reviews of evaluation practices would 
weaken this expectation, even if the board ultimately endorsed new practices.   Validating Expectation 4 
requires background information on board members initiating evaluation practice reviews or direct input 
from the board or key executives that private sector experience significantly contributed to dissatisfaction 
with the foundation’s existing evaluation practices. 
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Support in the Literature 
Institutional theory, coupled with Muukkonen’s civil society framework, suggests that 
institutional conflicts are to be expected at the margin of institutional boundaries.  Contributions from the 
study of complex adaptive systems supports this view, with evidence that innovation and change come 
from the boundaries of existing fields (J. H. Miller & Page, 2007).   Drawing from this literature, board 
members are expected to be important sources of institutional change in foundations, since they exist at 
the intersection of institutional spheres.  That is, board members play important roles inside the 
philanthropic sphere (as fiduciaries and decision-makers) as well as important roles outside the 
philanthropic sphere (as community leaders, successful professionals, etc.).  As such, they are expected to 
be vibrant sources of change.   
Given that board members are often successful business leaders, the expectation is that they 
would demand, or at least desire, that the foundations for which they are fiduciaries employ evaluation 
practices that capture organizational impact, as is commonly done in the private sector.   While 
performance measurement is not as straightforward in the nonprofit sector, noted business leaders have 
translated private sector practices for nonprofit sector purposes that could also work in foundation settings 
(Kramer, Parkhurst, & Vaidyanathan, 2009; Porter & Kramer, 1999).  Therefore, the expectation is that 
board members will initiate efforts to measure foundation performance through robust evaluation 
practices. 
 
Expectation 5:  “Young” Foundations Differ from Mature Foundation  
Expectation 5:  Relatively young foundations (e.g. those founded in the last twenty years) experiment with 
more robust and innovative evaluation practices than mature foundations (e.g. those founded more than 
twenty years ago).  
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This expectation relates to Stage III of the Greenwood et al model, described there as pre-
institutionalization.  During this stage, organizations innovate independently, seeking technically viable 
solutions to locally perceived problems.  Validating this expectation requires demonstrating that 
organizations are independently experimenting with innovative evaluation practices.  In addition, the 
expectation is that “younger” foundations tend to experiment with more robust and innovative approaches 
than mature foundations.  Validation of this expectation could come through supporting evidence, such 
as: 
1) New foundations experimenting with their own approach to evaluation, rather than modeling their 
approach after mature foundations; or 
2) Mature foundations experimenting with new evaluation processes, modeled after those developed 
by new foundations. 
 
Support in the Literature 
Almost by definition, philanthropic institutions operate independently.  This independence is a 
result of each foundation’s unique charter and the intent of its founder(s).  It is also partially a result of 
being relatively sheltered from competitive market pressures and regulatory constraints.  One social 
benefit of this independence is that foundations can function entrepreneurially and have the freedom to 
innovate, without burdensome shareholder oversight or arduous regulatory hurdles.  
Institutional theory suggests that new actors generate new practices.  Therefore, the presence of 
new entrants is another potential source of innovation.  Consistent with this perspective, institutional 
theorists have found a relationship between organizational characteristics and the era in which the 
organizations were founded.  That is, the “generally accepted” organizational practice at the time when 
the organization is founded tends to firmly “stick” with the organization over its lifetime (Scott, 1987).  
This suggests that “young” foundations will generally have different practices than “mature” foundations.  
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Therefore, the emergence of new players leads to new practices.  These new practices are typically 
perceived as innovative, or “entrepreneurial” if for no other reasons than they are new (not necessarily 
better).   Therefore, institutional entrepreneurship is expected to be associated with the emergence of new 
actors. 
These views about innovation and lifecycle are particularly relevant to the field of philanthropy in 
general and evaluation practices in particular.  In earlier times, philanthropic wealth came from 
manufacturing and banking empires.  The organizational and philosophical paradigm of this generation 
built the American philanthropic movement.  Today, the fantastic growth in capital markets and the “dot 
com” boom has created a new movement:  venture philanthropy.   This movement was initiated by 
philanthropists who made their fortunes by thinking “outside the box.”  High-tech entrepreneurs broke the 
traditional business model, flattening organizational hierarchies and introducing new technologies that 
have permanently altered generally accepted business practices and social culture.  Now, these individuals 
apply their business (and product development) skills to social ills by breaking the traditional model of 
philanthropy (Solomon, 2009).    
Many of these entrepreneurs, most famously Bill Gates and Jeffrey Skoll, made their fortunes 
relatively early in their careers.  As a result, they often view philanthropy as a second career.  They are 
not only active funders, but also highly engaged in social experimentation and influential in policy-
making circles.   They bring a “giving while living” passion to a field historically established by estate 
bequests and administered by lawyers and bankers.  The influence of these individuals is evident in the 
lexicon of philanthropy, which now includes terms such as “social ventures” and “social entrepreneurs” 
(Solomon, 2009).   
Emerging trends in the philanthropic engagement model also suggest that these new entrants have 
broadly impacted foundation practices.  While foundations have traditionally embraced a  laissez faire 
governance approach toward their grantees, a new brand of philanthropist is promoting an engagement 
43 
 
model that includes direct board involvement or even board representation in grantee organizations 
(Novogratz, 2009; Pittsburgh Social Venture Partners, 2010; Solomon, 2009).  They have also 
implemented performance metrics that strive to capture social return on investment and results-oriented 
evaluation approaches (Novogratz, 2009; Solomon, 2009). 
Broadly speaking, these innovations stem from paradigm shifts, or using the vocabulary of 
institutional theorists from the field of sociology “taken for granted assumptions”, relative to performance 
measurement and organizational purpose.  Traditionally, mature foundations rewarded grantees for good 
ideas or good relationships with funders, with much less emphasis on capturing impact.  Performance 
metrics from the private sector are beginning to seep over to the social sector, as evidenced by growing 
attention to Social Return on Investment (SROI) and other impact-oriented metrics.  Therefore, the 
expectation is that younger foundations are more likely to embrace these contemporary management 
practices than replicate the established/traditional practices of mature foundations.   
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3.2 QUALITATIVE EXPLORATION PROCESS 
To qualitatively explore these expectations, this research endeavor included key informant interviews 
with a small sample of executives representing a diverse array of foundations headquartered in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania.  These foundations included: 
 The Claude Worthington Benedum Foundation  
 The Falk Fund 
 The Forbes Funds 
 The Grable Foundation 
 The Heinz Endowments 
 The McCune Foundation 
 Pittsburgh Social Venture Partners 
 Women and Girls Foundation 
 
Though the foundations in this sample are diverse in terms of asset size and life cycle, they are not diverse 
geographically and may not represent the diversity of practices evidenced nationally.    
 
Organizational Demographics
6
 
For this sample, the 2009 median asset size was $113,788,574 with a maximum and minimum of 
$1,373,427,000 and $39,607, respectively.  In this sample, asset size and life cycle are correlated only for 
the three smallest foundations. The sample life cycle, i.e. “age” as of 2009, ranges from a minimum of 
seven years to maximum of 80 years, with a median of 30 years.   The two youngest foundations were 
founded after 2000.  Of the eight foundations, five are fully endowed family foundations.  
The other three, and smallest, organizations are not family foundations and also actively seek new 
funds from individuals and/or other foundations.  This dynamic puts pressure on them to demonstrate 
their value.  As evidenced through the interview discussions, the need to generate revenues influences 
                                                          
6
 See Appendix C for complete demographic statistics. 
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their attitudes about evaluation and their resulting practices.  This is an important dynamic that is not 
mentioned in the existing literature but is discussed in more detail later in this analysis. 
Since Pittsburgh does not have large foundations recently founded by high-tech entrepreneurs, the 
key informant interviews do not capture the influence of these types of new entrants.  However, the 
Pittsburgh Social Venture Partnership (PSVP) did represent this sector in some ways.  While it is not a 
fully endowed foundation, PSVP’s “personality” is very entrepreneurial and its engagement model is 
philosophically consistent with the venture philanthropy movement.  It is also relatively young, having 
been founded in 2001.  
As a result, this small sample does provide a starting point for exploring the expectations that 
emerged from the literature and Greenwood et al model, which offers a contribute to the field, at least at 
the local level.    
 
Fundamental Purposes of the Key Informant Interviews  
 The key informant interviews fulfilled two purposes: 1) qualitative exploration of the 
“expectations” which emerged from the literature and Greenwood et al model and 2) the opportunity to 
listen to and learn from respected practitioners.  In this spirit, the findings are also reported in two parts.  
The first part reconciles the interviewees’ perspectives with the expectations.  The second part highlights 
interesting but incidental learnings which surfaced during conversations with interviewees.  
 
Process Approach to Key Informant Interviews 
 The key informant interviews captured data from eight local foundations during September and 
October, 2010.  The interviews reflect the perspective of either the chief executive or senior staff.  For 
one organization, the board chair also participated in the interview.  The interviews lasted approximately 
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45 minutes.  This included a brief (five to ten minute) written questionnaire to capture current evaluation 
practices.  The remaining time was spent discussing the unique attributes of the organization’s approach, 
the entities (e.g. the board, chief executive, staff, regulators, etc.) that influence the organization’s 
approach, and the most influential experiences (non-profit, private sector, public sector involvement, etc.) 
which shape evaluation practices.  The complete survey instrument is presented in Appendix D.  A 
detailed summary of findings appears in Appendix E.   
 The written questionnaire included questions from a recent national survey conducted by the 
Urban Institute (UI).  These questions were used with the expressed written permission of UI.  These 
questions were included because they were well-written and had been developed and tested by a well-
respected research institution.  In addition, the written questionnaire also asked about the characteristics 
of the foundation’s peer group and its peer network. 
To capture the relative importance of different entities, interviewees were given eleven cards, 
each listing a different entity7.  The interviewees were asked to select and then rank the top three to five 
entities that were most important relative to four questions, related to the entities that most influence: 
1.  Their approach to grantee-evaluation  
2. Their approach to self-evaluation  
3. The field’s (or their peers’) approach to grantee-evaluation  
4. The field’s approach to self-evaluation 
 
                                                          
7
 These eleven entities were: Board of Trustees, Donor Relations, General Public Opinion, Government 
Agency/Public Sector Practices, Grant Recipients, Other Foundations/Peers, Policy-Makers/Regulators, 
President/Executive Director, Senior Staff/Program Officers, Social Entrepreneur Movement, and “Other”.  
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Next, the interviewees were presented with a set of nine different cards which listed various 
experiences/background8 and asked to follow the same selection and ranking process for a different set of 
four questions, related to the experiences/background of individuals/entities that most influence: 
1. Their organization’s grantee-evaluation approach  
2. Their organization’s self-evaluation approach  
3. The field’s grantee-evaluation approach  
4. The field’s self-evaluation approach  
 
As noted here, the interview questions distinguished between grantee- and foundation-focused 
evaluation practices.  One reason for this was the theoretical supposition that grantee evaluations are 
“technical” processes and foundation evaluation are “core institutional” processes. The thought being that 
each impact level may respond to different motivational forces, or perhaps respond differently to the same 
motivational forces (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Parsons, 1960).  This theoretical perspective suggests that 
foundation-focused evaluation will require grantee-focused evaluations, but that the reverse may not 
necessarily hold true.  In retrospect, the ultimate findings were not conclusive on this point.   
 
3.3  INTERVIEW FINDINGS AND THEMES 
As mentioned earlier, the interviews served two purposes:  exploring the “expectations” and listening and 
learning.  Consistent with this approach, the interview findings are presented in two parts.  Part one 
revisits the initial expectations.  Part two discusses several interesting but incidental findings and themes. 
                                                          
8
 These nine experiences/background were:  Capital markets experience, Experience at another foundation, Fund-
raising experience, Marketing/public relations experience, Nonprofit organization/practitioner experience, Policy-
making/regulatory experience, Private sector experience, Public sector/government agency experience, and 
“Other”. 
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3.3.1 Part I: Reconciling the Initial Expectations and Interviewee Feedback 
The expectations, or preliminary propositions, explored in this research paper emerged from the literature 
and the conceptual model developed by Greenwood et al (2002).  Therefore, the focus of this section is 
reconciling the key informant interviews with the expectations.  Significant discontinuities between the 
literature and the key information interviews are noted.  However, the primary emphasis in this section is 
on determining whether or not the key informant interviews provide any evidence of tendencies that 
might support the initial expectations and provide opportunities for future research investigations.   
 
Expectation 1:  Foundations do not fully trust the viability of evaluation tools and the usefulness of the 
information that evaluation tools provide. This is a significant barrier to adopting robust evaluation 
practices. 
 
Key informants provided general support for this expectation.  In the interviews, even advocates 
of independent grantee evaluation voiced concerns about either the tool or the users, echoed by the 
sentiments of one interviewee, “The key issues with evaluation are how do you address attribution versus 
contribution?  How can grantees collect reliable data without detracting from their work?”  What do you 
do with it (evaluation)?”  These concerns are commonly cited in the literature and were very much at the 
forefront of interviewee conversations about evaluation, especially grantee-focused evaluation.   
As mentioned earlier, recent national surveys suggested that with regard to evaluation, stated 
priorities do not translate into actual practices.  Interviewees in this sample took this view one step 
further, suggesting that actual practices may not translate into actual impact.  Interviewees generally 
believe that although most foundations require grantees to submit evaluation reports, these reports may 
not actually change the behavior of either the grantee or the foundation.  One interviewee suggested that 
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most foundations don’t really use the information grantees provide in evaluation reports, “My sense is 
that we complete the loop more rigorously than others”.   Several others cited fundamental concerns with 
evaluation practices, articulated best by this quote, “Broad conversations about evaluation are overdone.  
Navel gazing is detrimental to the work we ought to be doing.  At the end of the day, the important 
question is does the evaluation change your behavior?  Have you learned anything about yourself?  How 
do you evaluate the evaluation?”   
Several interviewees, however, spoke confidently about the value of the approach their 
foundation uses to evaluation grants and their own organizational performance.  These interviewees 
described how their foundation approaches grantee evaluations and incorporated the evaluation findings 
into its decision-making processes.  “Evaluation is a process for the nonprofit and foundation to integrate 
in daily practice for the sake of continuous quality improvement.  Practical monitoring tools are more 
important than retrospective external evaluations.”  These interviewees were very engaged in talking 
about the lessons they have learned from project failures and the initiatives that have come out of 
conversations about the initial short-comings of past projects, “We have changed in order to response to 
new areas of need. Unintended consequences (of projects the foundation funds) are difficult to find but 
usually are found investigating failures.”   
 
Expectation 2:  Over time, changes in the evaluation practices of philanthropic foundations will 
predominantly come from endogenous social shifts. Though exogenous regulatory jolts may trigger 
abrupt change in high-level foundation practices, it is less likely that these regulations will directly 
impact evaluation practices.  Regulators are more likely use tax policy to extract larger distributions 
from foundations than to pursue more drastic measures, such as establishing agencies to monitor the 
performance of philanthropic institutions. 
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The interview feedback supports the expectation that internal social shifts are more commonly the 
source of organizational change to management practices than external regulatory jolts.  Interviewees 
generally felt that foundations determine their own path, with little outside influence, with comments such 
as these, “We‟re focused on our own mission.” Another foundation representative said, “It (evaluation) is 
easier for family foundations because we are following the intentions of a family and carrying out their 
vision.” One family foundation representative mentioned the importance of generational changes, 
“Generational changes bring new ideas, some good and some not so good”.  While none of the other 
family foundations specifically mentioned this factor, it may be important in other family foundations but 
just didn’t come up in the interview.  There was also evidence that growth in concentrated wealth has 
altered the composition of the foundation community, since two of the foundations included in this 
process were founded within the last ten years. 
Internal shifts in organizational direction and strategy were evidenced through dissatisfaction 
with the status quo.  All interviewees believe that their organizations can (and must) continue to work to 
improve social outcomes.  Some were more passionate about the need to demonstrate organizational 
value than others.  At one end of the spectrum were two interviewees who felt strongly about their social 
responsibility to demonstrate outcomes, as reflected in this statement, “We have pride in what we are 
doing..we have an obligation to say we did or didn‟t do it (the project goal) to the best we are able.”  
Similarly, another stated that “We feel an accountability to the grantee community to evaluate our own 
performance.”    
At the other end of the spectrum were two foundations with different views.  One preferred 
working “like a Stealth aircraft…we focus on our relationship with the grantee.”  Another expressed the 
view that, “our value is through our partners.  We believe in leverage… to enable our grantees to 
increase their own capacity.”  The others were in the middle.  One interviewee captured the sentimental 
of this middle group, through this comment, “it is important to balance the need for outcome measures 
with making sure the kids (served by the grantees) have a roof over their head.”  The implication of this 
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conversation, and several others in the middle, is that evaluation does come at a cost and may distract the 
grantee from doing the work the organization does best.  To address this specific issue, several 
foundations prefer independent grantee evaluations, rather than self-reported outcomes.  
While there was also evidence of social peer network connectedness, most interviewees didn’t 
feel that the practices of other foundations impact their own evaluation practices.   In fact, several 
interviewees didn’t know much about other foundations’ evaluation practices, “I really don‟t know what 
others do or where the will for doing it comes from.”  As a result, there was no solid evidence that 
connectedness necessarily leads to internal shifts in foundations. This finding supports the earlier view 
from the literature that while networks serve to diffuse information, there are many other factors which 
influence the implementation of new practices at the organizational level (Clemens & Cook, 1999; 
Freeman, 1984; Rogers, 1995). 
Key informants were generally not concerned about future regulatory activity impacting 
evaluation practices.  At least one was disgruntled by the mere suggestion that regulators had any role in 
foundation activities, “We know that they want us to change but we are a family foundation.  We‟re not 
an extension of them (the government).”  Therefore, the interviews did not provide evidence that 
foundation practices are currently influenced by the threat of regulatory changes.  This finding is contrary 
to the national survey data.   
In combination, the evidence supports the expectation that regulatory jolts could precipitate 
organizational changes, but the threat of future regulations is not currently impacting management 
practices, including evaluation, at the key informants’ foundations.  
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Expectation 3:  Foundation board members, more than staff, initiate changes to evaluation practices.   
Based on the questionnaire of current practices and interview discussions, support for this 
expectation was weak, at best.  On the written questionnaire, most all ranked board members as the most 
influential decision-makers regarding evaluation practices.  However, the interview discussions suggest 
that board members do not necessarily initiate changes to management practices.  The most often noted 
sources of internal shift were the executive leadership, “The CEO is the driver of change.  Change is 
staff-driven”.   Another interviewee stated, “our board follows rather than leads”.  While board members 
must ultimately approve these changes, interviewees suggest that the impetus for exploring new practices 
typically come from executive staff, rather than board directors.   This also suggests that the chief 
executive may be the primary architect of management practices, including evaluation.   
 This finding seems inconsistent with the literature, which describes highly engaged boards 
leading organizational strategy and designing performance metrics.  This finding may reflect a weakness 
in the key informant process, given that it included only one board member.  It may also reflect a 
weakness in the survey instrument, as it did not clearly distinguish between “influence” and “initiate”, 
with regard to management practice changes.  The instrument assumed that decision-makers initiate 
change.  In retrospect, that was not a good assumption.  However, it may also suggest that highly engaged 
boards are an ideal, rather than actual reality at many local foundations.  A qualitative research process 
that included board members could provide more insights on this expectation.  
 
Expectation 4: Foundation board members initiate changes to evaluation practices because they are 
influenced by private sector measurement practices and seek similar performance metrics for the 
philanthropic institutions they serve. 
 Given the weak support for Expectation 3, there was even less evidence supporting Expectation 4.  
Interviewees ranked nonprofit experience, rather than private sector experience, as the most significant 
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influence shaping foundations’ evaluation practices. Interviewees suggested that the foundation staff’s 
nonprofit experience and the grantees’ opinions about evaluation are particularly influential.   Interview 
discussions suggest that foundations understand, and are also sympathetic to, the perspectives of and 
circumstances facing their grantees.   
In fact, most foundations specifically mentioned their desire to minimize the reporting burden on 
their grantees, reflecting this comment “We try not to be too arduous.  We are very conscious of the “net 
grant”.  We don‟t want our evaluation requirements to detract from the project.”  As articulated by one 
interviewee, “They (grantees) are why we try to keep it (evaluation) simple while still being valuable to 
them and to us.”   Another stated, “We don‟t pretend to have answers.  We listen (to the grantees) to find 
out what is working.”  
This finding runs counter to much of the literature, which paints an imbalanced, if not 
antagonistic, relationship between foundations and grantees.  This finding may simply reflect a weakness 
in the sample, as it included only foundations.  (Anecdotal feedback from nonprofit executives suggests 
they do not see their influence as significant nor do they perceive foundations as sympathetic to their 
circumstances.)  The influence of grantees on evaluation practices is an interesting finding and presents an 
opportunity for future research.  For example, a similar survey of nonprofit executives could assess what 
grantees perceive as the important entities and influences that shape the evaluation practices of local 
foundations.   
Since the interview process included only one board member, there isn’t conclusive evidence that 
Expectation 4 is completely unfounded.  However, the interviewees didn’t feel that the private sector 
experience was a dominant influence, “Practitioner experience is the most important thing.” Again, this 
is an expectation that could benefit from more intentional inclusion of foundation board members. 
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Expectation 5:  Relatively young foundations (e.g. those founded in the last twenty years) experiment with 
more robust and innovative evaluation practices than mature foundations (e.g. those founded more than 
twenty years ago).  
  
Overall, the interviews suggest tendencies which support this preliminary expectation.  Rather 
than imitate mature foundations, new foundations have established their own unique performance 
evaluation approaches.  One of these foundations sets its sights on very high level social indicators.  The 
chief executive of this organization admitted that their strategic goals were “wildly idealistic rather than 
actually achievable” but given their mission of social change they felt these were ultimately the right 
ones.  The other foundation formally measures only the “leverage factor” of its grants.  This foundation 
defines the leverage factor as the amount of grant money the grantee receives as a result of the project the 
foundation helped launch or enhance. These two new foundations are active in national peer networks, 
but neither felt their self-evaluation practices were shaped by peer influences.     
For most mature foundations, organizational performance evaluation has not changed 
substantially in the last ten years.   Therefore, there was no evidence that mature foundations are 
replicating practices of young foundations, as suggested as evidence that might support Expectation 5.  
However, interview discussions suggest that mature foundations are experimenting with grantee-focused 
evaluation practices and that one size doesn’t fit all.   
In general, the interviews suggest that among mature foundations there are two factors which 
heavily influence the approach foundations use to evaluate grantees:  1) the relationship between the 
grantee and the foundation and 2) the foundation’s confidence in the theory of change upon which the 
funded project is based.   Further dialogue might reveal that these two factors are intertwined.  That is, it 
could be that foundations have confidence in the theory of change because they first trust the grantee.  Or, 
alternatively, foundations may independently determine the theory of change they believe is “best” and 
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then select grantees which are capable of implementing the logic model the foundation has selected or 
developed.  The implication of this claim is that foundations will be more likely to evaluate new, or 
experimental, social initiatives than those that are familiar, defined as either a “proven” theory of change 
or a “proven” grantee. 
At least three foundations have distinctly different evaluation processes for grantees with which 
they have a long-standing relationship than for new grantees.  At one of these foundations, “(long-
standing) grantees get unrestricted grants.  They have different reporting requirements that they develop 
and we tweak interactively (with the grantee).”   At another, the evaluation approach is a function of the 
project and the lifecycle of the grantee, “With mature grantees, evaluation is an iterative process to revise 
goals with the grantee if the landscape changes.  With newer grantees, we focus not only on the outcomes 
but ask, is the grantee organization growing, too?” The evaluation approach at one of these foundations 
also varies depending on how familiar the foundation is with the program area.   Another foundation has 
made significant investments through independent evaluations to help identify leading indicators that 
signal that long-term social innovations are on track, “We don‟t put long-term obligations on short-term 
grants but we want to know, what are the promising midpoint indicators?”   
These examples suggest that relative to grantee-focused evaluation, “one size doesn’t fit all”.  
Both young and mature foundations appear to be developing unique approaches to specific types of grants 
or grantees.  In combination, these findings lend some support to the expectation that young foundation 
are more likely to experiment with unique approaches to evaluation than mature foundations.  However, 
the findings also suggest that at least some mature foundations are also experimenting with grantee 
evaluation practices.  This suggests that it is inappropriate to apply the “innovative” label only to young 
foundations. 
 
  
56 
 
3.3.2 Part 2:  Incidental Findings and Themes 
The Incidental findings include weaknesses in the conceptual model as well as interesting themes that 
emerged from the key informant interviews.   
 
Conceptual Model 
While the conceptual model employed here provided a robust platform from which to consider 
the preliminary stages of institutional change, further reflections on this model suggest that its later stages 
could be enhanced.  Specifically, the existing model fails to distinguish between adoption and 
internalization of change.  For purposes of this discussion, adoption refers to “going through the 
motions.”  For example, a foundation might adopt new evaluation practices before it learns to fully 
incorporate the results into decision-making processes.  In contrast, internalization involves meaningfully 
incorporating new practices into decision-making processes.   Both steps are needed to complete the cycle 
of institutional change (referred to as “re-institutionalization” in the Greenwood et al model). 
This research endeavor underscores the importance of measuring not simply the adoption of 
practices, but the internalization of practices.  As discussed earlier, the interviewees suggested that 
evaluation findings are not always internalized in a way that meaningfully impacts the organizational 
behavior of either the grantee or the foundation. This finding points out a short-coming of the conceptual 
model.  This model’s final two stages are Diffusion (Stage V) and Re-institutionalization (Stage 6).  
These stages do not adequately capture “internalization.”    Adding internalization as the penultimate 
stage would greatly enhance the model.  Figure 3 depicts the model with this enhancement. 
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FIGURE 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other Interesting Findings from Key Informant Interviews 
From the key informant interviews, one unexpected finding was the marked difference between 
the organizational evaluation approach of foundations that are fully endowed and those that are actively 
seeking new revenues.  However, two of these three foundations are also relatively young.  Therefore, it 
is difficult to determine if it is lifecycle or endowment status is driving these differences.  Whatever the 
case, it was interesting that foundations which are not fully endowed purposefully use grantee evaluation 
as an organizational performance measure.  These foundations actively promote their grant results to 
V: Diffusion 
*Increasing objectification 
*Pragmatic legitimacy 
 
“Diffusion occurs only if new ideas 
are compellingly presented as 
more appropriate than existing 
practices.” 
Fad or fashion 
I:  Precipitating Jolts and Shifts 
*Social.  
*Functional/Technological. 
*Regulatory/Political.   
 
“Destabilizes established 
practices” 
II: De-institutionalization 
*Emergence of new players 
*Institutional entrepreneurship 
*Ascendance of existing actors 
 
“Disturbs the…field level 
consensus by introducing new 
ideas and …the possibility of 
change.” 
III: Pre-institutionalization 
*Independent Innovations 
*Technical viability 
 
 “Organizations innovate 
independently, seeking 
technically viable solutions to 
locally perceived problems.” 
IV: Theorization 
*Specification of general 
organizational failing 
*Justification of abstract 
possible solution 
*Moral and/or pragmatic 
legitimacy 
 
“…theoretical accounts 
simplify and distill the 
properties of new practices 
and explain the outcomes 
they produce.” 
VI: Internalization 
*Institutional acceptance and 
implementation 
 
“…the ideas become integrated in 
the institution’s decision-making 
processes…” 
VII: Re-institutionalization 
*Cognitive legitimacy 
 
“…the ideas themselves become 
taken-for-granted…” 
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potential funders, as reflected by these comments, “I feel like we‟re a nonprofit because we‟re always 
seeking funds.”  “I have an ongoing accountability to our current and prospective donors to show 
results.”   
In contrast, the foundation-focused evaluation practices of fully-endowed foundations were 
somewhat different.  Almost all evaluate the collective performance of grants made within each of their 
major program areas (e.g. education, the arts, the environment, etc.) over a three to five year period.  
There is less emphasis on quantifying social impact.  One interviewee was especially articulate on this 
point, “Social impact is hard.  We think about it (social impact) but don‟t quantify it.  We‟re more 
focused on the impact of our convening power than our money.”  Without actually seeing written 
documentation, it is difficult to fully understand the precision incorporated in these strategic assessments.   
As already noted, there is an important distinct between adopting and internalizing practices.  Capturing 
evidence about how foundations use, or internalize, evaluation findings provides yet another opportunity 
for future research. 
Another unexpected finding was the extent to which interviewees downplayed the influence of 
peer practices on their foundation’s evaluation process, “My sense is that we complete the loop more 
rigorously than others”.   Another common response echoed this statement, “I‟m simply not sure what 
others are doing”.  The relatively minor influence of peers runs counter to the network theory literature.   
This may be a weakness of the survey instrument and questioning process.  Alternatively, it could signal 
that peer networks may be important for diffusing information but may not influence the adoption and 
implementation of organizational practices (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Freeman, 1984; Rogers, 1995).  
Another interesting finding was expressed through silence rather than words.  The literature 
strongly suggests that regulators, the public (e.g. public opinion), and the venture philanthropy movement 
significantly influence evaluation practices.  With regard to regulatory pressure, none of the interview 
participants either mentioned this as a factor for their foundation or ranked regulators as influencing their 
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approach to evaluation.  Only one ranked “public opinion” as important (it was #4 of 4 factors selected by 
this foundation).  Two ranked the “social entrepreneur movement” as influential (it was either #3 or #4 of 
4 factors selected by these foundations).   
One plausible explanation for this silence is that regulatory issues, public opinion, and venture 
philanthropy are more important to board members than staff members.  Since all but one of the 
interviews engaged only staff, the board perspective is absent from these interview conversations.  
Another possible explanation is that these foundations are not connected to national trends and 
movements.  However, the interviews documented that all of these foundations are engaged in regional, if 
not national, associations.  Several are highly engaged in national peer organizations, as evidenced by 
their participation in conference presentations and panels.  National affiliations were not correlated with 
the influence of regulators or the social entrepreneurial movement.  Geographic isolation from new 
venture philanthropy “mega” foundations may be another important consideration.  These institutions are 
simply not present in the Pittsburgh region, if local social networks were important for factors (which this 
study suggests they are not).  Though the interviews included one social entrepreneurial foundation, this 
organization receives funding from membership dues and does not have an endowment.  It is relatively 
small and therefore very unlike the “mega” foundations.  
 
Subtle, But Interesting, Themes 
In reflecting on both the literature and the interview discussions, one subtle but potentially 
interesting theme emerged that may also deserve further consideration.  This theme, tension, emerged not 
only through the investigation of institutional spheres but also in conversations about institutional 
practices/values, specifically accountability and innovation.  Though these two practices are not mutually 
exclusive, they may create tensions.  For example, accountability generally implies structure and 
oversight, whereas innovation implies flexibility and freedom.  Innovation can coexist with 
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accountability, by establishing shared expectations, articulating accountabilities for results/outcomes, and 
allowing for risk-taking (a.k.a. failures).   While balancing innovation and accountability is possible, it is 
probably not easy.  Strict interpretation of either practice/value could come at a cost to the other.  As 
independent domains, there is rich literature on both innovation and accountability.  These distinct fields 
provide vast opportunities for further research about how they relate to each other and how they are best 
balanced.  
 Another theme was the relationship between familiarity and evaluation practices.  As noted in the 
findings, the evaluation practices of mature foundations place more emphasis on the project process and 
grantee relationship than on quantitative impact measures.  Follow-up questions on this point suggest 
interviewees have concerns about the benefits and/or reliability of evaluation tools that measure 
outcomes, and thus tend to focus on ensuring that the process is consistent with proven theories of 
change.  Grantee reputation is also important, “They are advisors to what‟s working in the field.”  One 
specifically stated that the grantee leader is the most important factor in grant decisions, “80% of our 
grant giving is the leader. But is this good? Does it make the project replicable?” 
While sympathetic to the view that evaluation requires time and money that could otherwise 
support programmatic operations, philanthropic thought leaders might contest the assertion that “proven” 
strategies and organizations warrant less rigorous evaluation.  However, they would likely support 
different evaluation strategies for long-term social change initiatives than more narrowly focused projects. 
Failing to adequately employ any evaluation practice, even for “proven” strategies and long-term 
social change initiatives, leaves the foundations vulnerable on at least three fronts.  First, the funded 
project may simply not implement critical elements of a “proven” theory of change.  As a result, the 
project may have the right intentions but lack complete implementation, the consequence being failure to 
achieve expected outcomes.  Second, the theory of change itself may no longer work.  Changes in social 
structures and cultural orientations may not work in certain places.  Without evaluation, the necessity of 
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specific environmental or social factors may be simply taken for granted and their importance neither 
captured nor understood.   
Finally, leadership changes may alter real or perceived project outcomes.  Without consistent 
evaluation measures independent of leadership tenure, it will be difficult to determine if the leadership 
change impacted the outcomes of the project or if the leadership change simply alters the dynamic of the 
foundation-grantee relationship.  For example, a new grantee leader might have less polished 
communication skills which prevent that person from “selling” project success as well as the prior leader.  
Conversely, a new leader may be more effective at communication than a prior leader and “repackage” 
the project outcomes to be more appealing to potential funders.  Changes in foundation leadership could 
also impact the grantee-foundation relationship, making consistent evaluation approaches all the more 
important. 
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4.0  SUMMARY 
At this point, it is important to remember the research question that prompted this study, What exogenous 
and endogenous factors influence the evaluation practices of philanthropic foundations?  The 
literature, conceptual model and interview process provided a few answers to this question, but there 
remain many unanswered questions which provide opportunities for further research.  Before moving on 
to a discussion of future endeavors, it is first important to revisit the two key assumptions upon which this 
research question rested and evaluate the research process used here.  As stated in the introduction, these 
assumptions were: 
1. Evaluating performance is valuable; and 
2. Foundations are accountable to the public.   
 
While these assumptions were strongly supported by the literature, the interview conversations 
suggest that local foundation practitioners might not accept them.  Practitioner perspectives are very 
important to this study and thus prompt further discussion, if not reconsideration, of these core 
assumptions.   
Admittedly, evaluation is difficult.  Though most would agree that it is valuable, there are 
significant concerns about the ability of evaluation to capture social impacts, particularly indirect impacts 
and unintended consequences (both positive and negative).  Where confidence in the theory of change or 
the grantee is high, foundations are generally less willing to invest the time and/or money needed to 
conduct evaluations.  There are good reasons for this.  Evaluation requires extra effort, and also extra 
costs.  However, over-confidence in either the theory of change or the grantee also carries significant 
63 
 
costs and risk, conjuring up images of emperors without clothes.  Therefore, it is difficult to forfeit the 
assumption that evaluating performance is valuable, even if it has been “proven” in the past.  
The public accountability of foundations was also a sensitive subject with interviewees.  Though 
several specifically cited a moral obligation to demonstrate results, public opinion (much less public 
accountability) was not a significant factor in determining evaluation approaches and most do not share 
evaluation results publicly.  Government intervention is certainly not held in high esteem.  This suggests 
tension between accountability and innovation.  Foundations may worry that public accountability limits 
their flexibility to innovate and experiment with social programs.  That said, it seems viable that 
foundations can find ways to balance innovation and accountability: Operating as social entrepreneurs 
while also sharing knowledge by evaluating what works and what doesn’t.  Therefore, it is also difficult 
to forfeit the assumption that foundations are accountable to the public. 
In evaluating the research process itself, considerations include the effectiveness of the theoretical 
framework, conceptual model, and key informant interviews.  Overall, these components worked 
effectively to capture the unique dynamics of philanthropic foundations.  Institutional theory provided an 
extremely robust framework for understanding the sources and causes of institutional change.  While 
innovation studies, network analysis, and stakeholder theory provided important insights into inter-
personal behavior and relationships, institutional theory best captured the unique dynamics of the overall 
organization.  Though not highlighted specifically in the discussions of findings, the organizational 
change and complex adaptive systems literature helped inform understanding of overall institutional 
dynamics.  This understanding was essential to processing the interviewees’ responses and integrating 
these findings with institutional theory and the expectations.  
The multi-stage conceptual model was also valuable to this effort.  Since philanthropic 
institutions are somewhat sheltered from competitive market forces and constant regulation, change can 
occur relatively slowly, through internal shifts rather than abrupt jolts.  As a result, it was important that 
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the conceptual model have a relatively large number of stages of institutional change (six in this model), 
rather than just three or four.  The relatively large number made it easier to identify movement, especially 
through the initial stages, that might otherwise go undetected in a more simplistic approach or one which 
focused on latter stages, such as diffusion and implementation, rather than the initial stages of exploration.  
The final three stages of the Greenwood et al model:  theorization, diffusion, and re-
institutionalization, provide opportunities for further research.   As already discussed, the model could 
benefit from the addition of a step between diffusion and re-institutionalization, to capture 
“internalization”.   Diffusion and adoption are not sufficient evidence that evaluation practices actually 
impact organizational decision-making.  For this reason, it is critically important to capture information 
about how foundations internalize evaluation findings into decision-making processes.   
 
4.1 OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The most informative element of this research process was the interviews with local foundation 
practitioners.  Each was gracious with their time and thoughtful about their responses.  While these 
conversations provided the information needed to test the “expectations”, even more information was 
gained from simply listening to their views about evaluation practices.  Some of their perspectives were 
consistent with the literature, but others were not.  The findings (both expected and incidental) made the 
process more interesting, and suggest future research opportunities. These opportunities include further 
explorations of: 
 The connection between familiarity and grantee-focused evaluation.  One insight relative to the 
factors motivating evaluation practices was the importance of the grantee-funder relationship and 
the foundation’s trust in the theory of change.  Reviewing grantee evaluation reports and internal 
foundation documentation would provide greater clarity on this point.  Follow up interviews with 
both grantees and foundation representatives could also improve understanding of the connection, if 
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any, between grantee-foundation relationships, project risk/innovation (e.g. untested or unproven 
theories of change), and grantee-focused evaluation practices.   
 The influence of grantees on grantee- and foundation-focused evaluation practices.  
Interviewees suggest that grantees are very influential.  National grantee surveys and anecdotal 
evidence suggest that grantees do not share this perception (The Center for Effective Philanthropy, 
2006).   Expanding the key informant interviews to include executives of grantee organizations 
would provide an interesting perspective on their perceived role in grantee- and foundation-focused 
evaluation.  Also, including the board chairs of these foundations would provide more complete 
information from all stakeholders involved in the process, including their perspective on the factors 
that influences foundations’ evaluation practices. 
 
 The connection between organizational life cycle and foundation-focused evaluation.  The 
initial expectation of this study was that the venture philanthropy model was the force most likely 
to upset static equilibriums.  However, the association between organizational practices and the 
“dot com” model may be misplaced.   It may not be the venture philanthropy model per se but 
rather the presence of new entrants that disrupts institutional equilibriums.  Institutional theory 
suggests that new entrants adopt contemporary management practices, reflecting the era in which it 
is founded.  Further exploration of new entrants might demonstrate that it is simply lifecycle, rather 
than the high-tech entrepreneurial model, that is the force behind new organizational paradigms and 
practices.  
 
 The influence of perpetual endowments on philanthropic foundations.  Though not the focus of 
this study, the impact of perpetual endowments on organizational behavior was curious.  In fact, 
foundations without full endowments may share more in common with nonprofits than they do with 
fully endowed foundations.  They certainly operate under different paradigms.  Investigating the 
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organizational practices of these “revenue-seeking” foundations relative to fully endowed 
foundation could yield interesting results. 
 
4.2  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
As stated in the introduction of this paper, this research endeavor aspires to help policy-makers inside and 
outside the philanthropic community better understand how to motivate more foundations to adopt robust 
evaluation practices.  The limited scope of this study also limits the degree to which this research can 
make specific policy recommendations.  However, the literature and interview feedback suggest that 
policy-makers may wish to consider these ideas for improving the evaluation practices in the field of 
philanthropy: 
1. Provide more education to executive and senior staff about viable evaluation tools.  
Though there are serious concerns even in the field of evaluation research, many foundations 
are finding creative and cost-effective approaches.  This information should be shared more 
intentionally with staff practitioners to improve their trust in evaluation tools and results.  
Board members may not be the primary audience, given that staff may be more likely to 
initiate changes in evaluation practices than board directors. 
 
2. Emphasize the overall net social benefits of evaluation.  As stated repeatedly, evaluation 
provides benefit to the foundation, the grantee, and the field because it provides information 
about what works and what doesn’t.  Unfortunately, the costs fall on the foundation.  
Reframing the cost-benefit equation will require foundations to take into consideration the 
overall social benefit of evaluation, rather than simply the benefit they receive from 
information about grantee projects.  
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4.3  CONCLUSIONS 
The title of this research paper asks how foundations assess social impact.  The assumption in the sub-title 
is that evaluation practices are necessary tools in formulating answers to this question.  During the key 
information interviews, it became increasingly clear that evaluation data is only part of the solution.  The 
data also needs to be used.  At a minimum, the data should inform decision-making at the grantee and the 
foundation.  Ideally, it would facilitate learning in the field. 
These practices depend on the capabilities of the field of evaluation to provide systematic tools 
and objective experts which effectively and reliably capture the true effects of programmatic 
interventions, especially the interactive effects of environment and intervention.  Relative to the field of 
evaluation research, there is also a desperate need for “scholarship of common sense” (Freeman, et al., 
2010).  That is, more user-friendly approaches that balance the needs of real-world scenarios with the 
evidence-based and cost-benefit demands of policy-makers.   
While increasing strategic evaluation may require improvements in the tools, it also requires 
improvements in user-application, such as a different mix of foundation staff skills.  It is one thing to 
develop innovative tools; it is another for the information provided by these tools to impact decision-
making.  If foundations do not internalize evaluation findings, the tools really don’t matter.  This carries 
important implications for policy-makers.  There may be a need to invest in the development of better 
evaluation tools.  But, these investments are wasted if the evaluation findings are not internalized into 
decision-making processes.   
Another looming challenge is the bigger question, not of philanthropy’s social impact, but of its 
comparative advantage.  Robert Reich, an influential thought leader and policy-maker, asserts that “…for 
philanthropy to be worthwhile, it must do better than the state (at redistribution) than the state would do 
had the philanthropic assets been taxed” (Damon & Verducci, 2006).  This view positions philanthropic 
institutions and the state as competitors and also underlies much of the tax-policy debate.  However, this 
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view is not supported here.  As evidenced by the recent economic downturn, “sole reliance on the market 
is no panacea, nor is sole reliance on the state” (Salamon, 2002a).   
As entrepreneurial institutions, foundations play a valuable role, disrupting the inertia that keeps 
social institutions from achieving efficient equilibrium (Schramm, 2006).   The evidence from the 
Muukkonen framework and Schumpeter’s theories suggest that philanthropic institutions and the state do 
not have a competitive relationship but rather a symbiotic though perhaps “edgy” one.   
In the United States, foundations fund social experiments and have the flexibility to be true social 
entrepreneurs (Schramm, 2006).  This is not a role the state can play as well, if at all.  The state needs 
foundations to keeping funding social experiments, but the state also needs foundations to quantify the 
value of these programs if the programs themselves are to ever enjoy widespread public support. This 
view is counter to Reich’s assertion and the assumptions underlying the tax-policy debates:  it suggests 
important roles for both the state and foundations.  However, it also makes all the more evident the need 
for foundations to demonstrate the social impact of the programs they fund and to also demonstrate the 
value of their own institutions as social entrepreneurs.  This view also suggests that it is much more 
productive to discuss evaluation in terms of public value (its benefits to the grantee, foundation, nonprofit 
sector, and the field as a whole) than comparative advantage.  As such, this was the primary focus of this 
study.   
Interest in philanthropy and its social impact continues to make this research topic timely.  The 
clamor for foundations to increase their accountability and transparency is not likely to subside.  Those 
who question the legitimacy of private foundations in a democratic society are likely to use tax policy to 
force this issue, by limiting tax-exemptions and/or raising foundation distribution requirements.  To raise 
the level of civic discourse on this topic, both the public and foundations themselves need to better 
understand the social impact of both social experiments and philanthropic institutions.     
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Foundations are uniquely qualified to harness the collective wealth, influence, and experiences of 
innovative social experiments, as well as those that are “tried and true”.   Adopting and internalizing more 
robust evaluation practices will enable knowledge sharing about what works and what doesn’t.  This 
research endeavor suggests that this is yet another important social contribution foundations are extremely 
well-positioned to make.   
  
70 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
SELECTED LISTING OF UNIVERSITY CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE ON 
PHILANTHROPY  
 
Boston College 
Social Welfare Research Institute 
 Paul Schervish, Director 
 
City University of New York 
Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society 
 
Duke University 
Center for the Study of Philanthropy and Voluntarism 
Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy 
 
Grand Valley State University 
Dorothy A. Johnson Center for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Leadership 
 
Harvard University 
The Hauser Center for Nonprofit Institutions 
 
Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis  
The Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University 
 
Johns Hopkins University 
Institute for Policy Studies 
Center for Civil Society Studies 
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
Centre for Voluntary Organisation 
Department of Social Science & Administration 
 
Loyola University Chicago 
Philanthropy & Nonprofit Sector Graduate Certificate Program 
 
New York University School of Law 
Program on Philanthropy & Law  
 
Saint Mary's University of Minnesota 
Master of Arts, Philanthropy & Development 
 
University of Pennsylvania 
Center for Community Partnerships 
Penn Program for Public Service 
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University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Center for Women and Philanthropy 
 
Yale University 
Program on Nonprofit Organizations 
 
For the full list, see the original source:  http://www.independentsector.org/programs/research/centers.html 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
SUMMARY OF SURVEY PROCESSES AND FINDINGS 
 
 
 Key Questions Process Key Findings 
The Center for 
Effective 
Philanthropy 
(CEP) 
 
“Indicators of 
Effectiveness:  
Understanding 
and Improving 
Foundation 
Performance” 
 
Note: CEP has a 
plethora of 
publications  and  
assessment tools 
 How do 
foundations 
understand and 
assess the 
performance of 
their foundation? 
 How do/can 
foundations 
measure social 
impact? 
 Year: 2002 
 Scope: National 
 Participants:  CEOs of 
largest 225 U.S. 
foundations, grantees, 
foundation trustees, and 
other foundation staff 
 Instruments:  Surveys 
(34% response rate for 
CEO survey; 26% for 
grantee survey), 
interviews, review of 
publicly available 
information 
 Foundations want to measure social 
impact – both from a strategic 
perspective as well as a practical 
one to address regulatory scrutiny 
 However, the lack of data makes 
this effort a struggle 
 Some are experimenting with 
indirect indicators 
 Performance assessments fall into 
two categories: 
 Formal grant and program 
evaluations (expensive) 
 Administrative measures of internal 
(foundation) performance, such as 
operating costs and investment 
performance (weakly tied to social 
impact) 
Outcome:  Conceptual framework for 
assessing foundation performance at 
three levels: 
 Internal (foundation) operations 
 Grantee relations and grantee 
operations 
 Recipient impact 
Grantmakers for 
Effective 
Organizations 
(GEO) 
 
“Listen, Learn, 
Lead” 
 Where can 
changed practices 
make the greatest 
difference?  
 Who in 
philanthropy is 
leading change? 
 Year: 2006 
 Scope: National  
 Participants: Nonprofit 
leaders and grantmakers 
 Instruments: “Hundreds” 
of participants through 9 
focus groups & 30 
interviews 
 Grantmakers believe they succeed 
through the success of their grantees 
 Grantees believe foundations should 
make long-term investments that 
allow nonprofits to make long-term 
changes in their respective 
communities 
 Grantees believe foundations are 
disconnected from community 
needs;  they do not seek feedback 
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and do not listen to the advice and 
perspective of field practitioners 
 The relationships between 
grantmakers and grantees lack trust 
which prevents long-term 
partnerships and funding 
relationships 
The Urban 
Institute (UI) 
(Center on 
Nonprofits and 
Philanthropy) 
 
“Attitudes and 
Practices 
Concerning 
Effective 
Philanthropy” 
 What is 
“effectiveness” 
 How do 
foundations see 
themselves? 
 How do they 
function? 
 Are they fully 
functioning in 
ways that they feel 
they should be? 
 Year: 2004 
 Scope: National  
 Participants: 1,192 
staffed 
grantmaking 
foundations  
 Survey (35% 
response rate, 
though the rate 
varied by 
foundation size) 
 The type (community, corporate, or 
independent), region, and size of the 
foundation impacted attitudes and 
practices concerning effective 
philanthropy. 
 However, a key outcome of this 
study was the development of a 
typology of effectiveness 
frameworks that worked across 
these basic categories. 
  
Outcome:  Typology of effectiveness 
frameworks 
 Proactive orientation 
 Technical assistance/capacity 
building (for grantee) 
 Social policy/advocacy 
 Internal (foundation) staff 
development 
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APPENDIX C 
ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOGRAPHICS OF FOUNDATIONS REPRESENTED IN KEY 
I NFORMANT INTERVIEWS 
 
Foundations Represented 
 The Claude Worthington Benedum Foundation  
 The Falk Fund 
 The Forbes Funds 
 The Grable Foundation 
 The Heinz Endowments 
 The McCune Foundation 
 Pittsburgh Social Venture Partners 
 Women and Girls Foundation 
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Organizational Demographics 
Foundation Statistics Assets Annual Grants Year Founded Age, as of 2009 
 Falk  $        19,149,710   $          529,471  1929 80 
 Heinz  $  1,373,427,000   $    54,551,000  1941 68 
 Grable  $      208,427,438   $    11,510,882  1979 30 
 WGF  $              400,000   $             50,000  2002 7 
 Benedum  $      288,825,313   $    18,862,619  1944 65 
 PSVP  $                39,607   $             42,301  2001 8 
 Forbes  $          5,629,134   $          399,273  1982 27 
 McCune  $      416,601,190   $    26,650,253  1979 30 
      
 Average  $      289,062,424   $    14,074,475   39 
 Median  $      113,788,574   $       6,020,177   30 
 Max  $  1,373,427,000   $    54,551,000   80 
 Min  $                39,607   $             42,301   7 
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APPENDIX D 
 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
 
 
Organization:____________________________________ 
Name/Position: __________________________________ 
 
For purposes of this survey, “grantee-focused” evaluation refers to efforts to assess the project 
funded and/or the grantee organization.  “Foundation-focused” evaluation refers to 
organizational performance measures and/or goal-based mission achievement of the 
foundation. 
 
Current Practices:  Grantee-  and Foundation-Focused Evaluation
9
  
1. How does the foundation monitor whether grant funds are used as specified? (Check the 
most appropriate box for each item.) 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
Site visits      
Interim reports required      
Final reports required      
Puts representative on grantee board      
Puts representative on grantee advisory 
committee 
     
By its ongoing involvement in the 
community/field 
     
Please list other ways the foundation often or always monitors the use of funds 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 Interview questions #1 through #8 taken from the  Urban Institute’s 2004 Survey “Attitudes and Practices 
Concerning Effective Philanthropy”, led by Francie Ostrower. Used with written permission. 
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2. Does the foundation require grantees to collect information on outcomes of their work? 
 Never 
 Rarely 
 Sometimes 
 Often  
 Always 
 
3. Does the foundation itself ever formally evaluate the work that it funds? 
 No (skip to Question 8) 
 No, but plans to do so within the next 12 months (skip to Question 8) 
 Yes 
 
 
4. Why does the foundation conduct grantee evaluations?  How important are the 
following? (Check the most appropriate box for each item.) 
 
 Not At 
All 
Not very  Somewhat Very 
Learn whether original objectives were 
achieved 
    
Learn about implementation of funded work     
Learn about outcomes of funded work     
Contribute to knowledge in the field     
Strengthen organizational practices in the 
field 
    
Strengthen public policy     
Strengthen its future grantmaking     
Please indicate any other very important reasons 
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5. For whom are the results of the foundation’s evaluations intended?  (Check the most 
appropriate box for each item.) 
 
The results are intended for… Not At All Somewhat Mainly 
Grantee organizations    
Other nonprofits in the grantee’s field    
Foundation staff    
Foundation board    
Policymakers    
Other foundations    
Please list others for whom results are mainly intended: 
 
 
 
 
6. How often are the results of the foundation’s evaluations made public? 
 Never (Skip to Question 8) 
 Rarely 
 Sometimes 
 Often  
 Always 
 
 
 
7. How are evaluation results distributed? (Check all that apply.) 
 Website 
 Published papers and reports 
 Other foundation publications 
 Conferences/meetings 
 Press releases 
 Other major distribution outlets.  Please list:__________________________ 
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8.  During the past two years, did the foundation engage in any of the following activities to 
help evaluate or strengthen its own performance?  (Check all that apply.) 
 
 Conduct a strategic planning process 
 Conduct a board retreat 
 Conduct formal review of staff performance 
 Review grants for consistency with stated foundation priorities 
 Compare itself to other foundations 
 Conduct a formal needs assessment of its field or community 
 Solicit anonymous feedback from grantees through surveys/interviews/focus 
groups 
 Solicit non-anonymous feedback from grantees through surveys/interviews/focus 
groups 
 Other important activities:  Please specify:_______________________ 
 
 
 
 
9. When you compare your organization’s current evaluation practices to other foundations, 
rank the importance of these factors in defining a comparator group: 
 
 Endowment size 
 
 Geographic proximity 
 
 Governance structure (private/family foundations, community foundations, corporate 
foundations) 
 
 Similar programmatic focus areas (arts, youth, health issues, the environment, etc.) 
 
 Other (please explain): 
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10.  Please list the national and regional conferences your foundation regularly attends.  
Please circle those conferences in which your foundation has made a presentation or 
served on a panel in the past three years. 
 
National Conferences      Regional Conferences   
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Discussion Questions  
 The next set of questions is designed to capture your perspectives on the practices of your 
organization, as well as the “field” of private philanthropy as a whole.   Recognizing that foundation 
practices vary widely, please respond as best you can regarding the practices of either the field or those 
foundations included in your comparator group. 
 
With regard to grantee-focused evaluation, how do you view your current approach relative to the field as 
a whole?  What are the most significant similarities?  Differences? 
Similarities   
 
 
Differences 
 
 
With regard to foundation-focused evaluation, how do you view your current approach relative to the 
field as a whole?  What are the greatest similarities?  Differences? 
Similarities 
 
 
Differences 
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The next four questions ask about the influences that drive evaluation practices in your organization.   
The entities that most influence our organization’s approach to grantee evaluation (Please rank): 
For the top five influences, please provide specific examples. For example, if “peers/other foundations” 
factor into your organization’s approach, please list those peers that are most influential.   
 
 Board of Trustees 
 
 Donor Relations 
 
 General Public Opinion 
 
 Government Agency/Public Sector Practices 
 
 Grant Recipients 
 
 Other Foundations/Peers  
 
 President/Executive Director 
 
 Policy-Makers/Regulators 
 
 Senior Staff/Program Officers 
 
 Social Entrepreneur Movement 
 
 Other (Please describe) 
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The entities that most influence our organization’s approach to self-evaluation are (Please rank): 
 
 Board of Trustees 
 
 Donor Relations 
 
 General Public Opinion 
 
 Government Agency/Public Sector Practices 
 
 Grant Recipients 
 
 Other Foundations/Peers 
 
 Policy-Makers/Regulators 
 
 President/Executive Director 
 
 Senior Staff/Program Officers 
 
 Social Entrepreneur Movement 
 
 Other (Please describe) 
 
  
84 
 
The experiences/background of the individuals/entities that most influence our foundation’s 
approach to grantee evaluation are (Please rank): 
 
 Capital markets experience 
 
 Experiences at another foundation 
 
 Fund-raising experience 
 
 Marketing/public relations experience 
 
 Nonprofit organization/practioner experience 
 
 Policy making/regulatory experience 
 
 Private sector experience  (Please describe:  banking, heavy manufacturing, high tech, etc.) 
 
 Public sector/government agency experience 
 
 Other (Please describe) 
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The experiences/background of individuals/entities that most influence our organization’s self- 
evaluation approach are (Please rank): 
 
 Capital markets experience 
 
 Experiences at another foundation 
 
 Fund-raising experience 
 
 Marketing/public relations experience 
 
 Nonprofit organization/practioner experience 
 
 Policy making/regulatory experience 
 
 Private experience  (Please describe:  banking, heavy manufacturing, high tech, etc.) 
 
 Public sector/government agency experience 
 
 Other (Please describe) 
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The next four questions ask for your opinion on the field as a whole. 
The entities that most influence THE FIELD’S approach to grantee evaluation are (Please rank): 
 
 Board of Trustees 
 
 Donor Relations 
 
 General Public Opinion 
 
 Government Agency/Public Sector Practices 
 
 Grant Recipients 
 
 Other Foundations/Peers 
 
 President/Executive Director 
 
 Policy-Makers/Regulators 
 
 Senior Staff/Program Officers 
 
 Social Entrepreneur Movement 
 
 Other (Please describe) 
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The entities that most influence THE FIELD’S approach to self-evaluation are (Please rank): 
 
 Board of Trustees 
 
 Donor Relations 
 
 General Public Opinion 
 
 Government Agency/Public Sector Practices 
 
 Grant Recipients 
 
 Other Foundations/Peers 
 
 Policy-Makers/Regulators 
 
 President/Executive Director 
 
 Senior Staff/Program Officers 
 
 Social Entrepreneur Movement 
 
 Other (Please describe) 
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The experiences/background of the individuals/entities that most influence THE FIELD’S 
approach to grantee evaluation are: 
 
 Capital markets experience 
 
 Experiences at another foundation 
 
 Fund-raising experience 
 
 Marketing/public relations experience 
 
 Nonprofit organization/practioner experience 
 
 Policy making/regulatory experience 
 
 Private sector experience (Please describe:  banking, heavy manufacturing, high tech, etc.) 
 
 Public sector/government agency experience 
 
 Other (Please describe) 
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The experiences/background of individuals/entities that most influence THE FIELD’S approach to 
self- evaluation are: 
 
 Capital markets experience 
 
 Experiences at another foundation 
 
 Fund-raising experience 
 
 Marketing/public relations experience 
 
 Nonprofit organization/practioner experience 
 
 Policy making/regulatory experience 
 
 Private sector experience  (Please describe:  banking, heavy manufacturing, high tech, etc.) 
 
 
 Public sector/government agency experience 
 
 Other (Please describe) 
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APPENDIX E 
 
SURVEY FINDINGS:  SUMMARY OF CURRENT PRACTICES 
 
1. How does the foundation monitor whether grant funds are used as specified? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1
2
3
4
5
1 = Never
5 = Always
Site Visits (n=8)
1
2
3
4
5
1 = Never
5 = Always
Interim Reports (n=8)
1
2
3
4
5
1 = Never
5 = Always
Final Reports (n=8)
1
2
3
4
5
1 = Never
5 = Always
Place Foundation 
Representative on 
Grantee Board  (n=8)
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1
2
3
4
5
1 = Never
5 = Always
Place Foundation 
Representative on Grantee 
Advisory Committee  (n=8)
1
2
3
4
5
1 = Never
5 = Always
Through Field/Community 
Involvement   (n=8)
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2. Does the foundation require grantees to collect information on outcomes of their work? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Does the foundation itself ever formally evaluate the work that it funds? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1
2
3
4
5
1 = Never
5 = Always
(n=7)
1
2
3
4
5
1 = Never
5 = Always
(n=8)
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4. Why does the foundation conduct grantee evaluations?  How important are the following? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
2
3
4
1=Not Important             
4=Very Important
To learn if original objective 
achieved (n=4)
1
2
3
4
1=Not Important
4=Very Important
To learn if original objective 
achieved (n=4)
1
2
3
4
1=Not Important
4=Very Important
To learn if original 
objective achieved (n=4)
1
2
3
4
1=Not Important
4=Very Important
To learn about 
implementation (n=4)
1
2
3
4
1=Not Important
4=Very Important
To learn about outcomes 
(n=4)
1
2
3
4
1=Not Important
4=Very Important
To contribute to field 
knowledge (n=4)
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Why does the foundation conduct grantee evaluations?  How important are the following? (con’t) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0
1
2
3
4
1=Not Important
4=Very Important
To strengthen organization in the 
field (n=4)
0
1
2
3
4
1=Not Important
4=Very Important
To strengthen public policy 
(n=4)
0
1
2
3
4
1=Not Important
4=Very Important
To strengthen own future grant-
making (n=4)
95 
 
5. For whom are the evaluation intended? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1
2
3
1 = Not At All
3 = Mainly
Grantees  (n=6)
1
2
3
1 = Not At All
3 = Mainly
Other Nonprofits in Grantees' Field  
(n=6)
1
2
3
1 = Not At All
3 = Mainly
Foundation Staff (n=6)
1
2
3
1 = Not At All
3 = Mainly
Foundation Board  (n=6)
1
2
3
1 = Not At All
3 = Mainly
Policymakers  (n=6)
1
2
3
1 = Not At All
3 = Mainly
Other Foundations  (n=6)
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6. During the past two years, did the foundation engage in any of the following activities to 
help evaluate or strengthen its own performance?  (Check all that apply.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Formal needs assessment
Other  (Internal Reports, Donors …
Compare self to other foundations
Solicit anonymous feedback from …
Solicit non-anonymous feedback from …
Board Retreat
Review grants to foundation priorities
Strategic Planning Process
Staff performance review
Number of Foundations Engaging in Activity (n=8)
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7. Important factors in defining a comparator group: 
 Endow-
ment 
Size 
Geographic 
proximity 
Governance 
structure 
Similar 
programmatic 
focus areas 
Other 
Foundation A 1 2 4 3  
Foundation B 2  3 1  
Foundation C 2 4 3 1  
Foundation D   3 1 2 (Systemic 
Change ) 
Foundation E 4 3 2 1  
Foundation F     1 (National 
association) 
Foundation G    1  
Foundation H 3 4 2 1  
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